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THE AMERICAN RULE OF ATTORNEY'S

FEES:

PRIVATE LITIGATION

A.

Introduction

For generations of American lawyers it has been boldfaced
black letter law that in the absence of contrary statutory authority a litigant must, with few exceptions, bear the single greatest
cost of asserting his legal rights-his attorney's fees-regardless
' 2
of the outcome of his action.' This so-called "American Rule of
attorney's fees is almost unique in the jurisprudential world. 3
Indeed, Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested, 4 a stranger newlyarrived in this country, faced with a small claim, is likely to be
astonished when asked by a lawyer for an advance retainer;
'See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 60-71 (1935).
2The term "American Rule" is used throughout this Comment in the sense just
described. The contrasting rule-allowing attorney's fees to be recovered by a successful
litigant in the ordinary course-will sometimes be referred to as the "English Rule" for
the sake
of convenience.
3
See generally, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE,
PROCEEDINGS ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION 125 (1953); A.
ENGELMANN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (7th ed. R. Millar transl.
1927).
In many civil law countries, attorney's fees are today awarded to a prevailing party as
a matter of right and are controlled by sets of tariff schedules. For an analysis of the law
of Germany, see Shartel & Wolff, Civil Justice in Germany, 42 MICH. L. REv. (1944). For a
discussion of the award of fees in South Africa, see Rubin & Stanford, The Sources of
South-African Law of Costs, 65 S. AFR. L.J. 387 (1948). For Swiss and pre-communist
Hungarian provisions, see Baeck, Imposition of Legal Fees and Disbursement of Prevailing
Party upon the Losing Party-Under the Laws of Switzerland, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE
ON COMPARATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS ABA INTERNATIONAL AND

COMPARATIVE LAw SECTION 117, 124 (1962); Dietz, Payment of Court Costs by the Losing
Party Under the Laws of Hungary, id. 131.
4Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REv. 792
(1966).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:636

anywhere else in the world the lawyer would expect to obtain his
fees from the defendant.5
Legal commentators have in recent years expressed amazement, disappointment and outrage at the American system's
persistence in its eccentricity, despite voluminous collected evidence of the inequities and shortcomings inherent in its approach to attorney's fees.6 Most scholarly criticisms have pointed
to the English system, which generally awards reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing litigant,7 and have compared the8
relative success of our own to make whole the wronged litigant;
5Id. 792.
6 For a good analysis of the inequities of the American Rule, especially in reference
to the small claim, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 4. See also Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees Be
Allowed?, 13 CAL. ST. B.J., Mar., 1938, at 42; Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929);
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REv. 75 (1963);
Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity S)stem, 55 IOWA L. REv. 26
(1969); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages,
15 MINN. L. REv. 691 (1931); Stirling, Attorney's Fees: Who Should Bear the Burden?, 41 CAL.
ST. B.J. 874 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees, 43 Miss. L.J. 238 (1972); Note, Attorneys
Fees as an Element of Damage, 15 U. CINN. L. REv. 313 (1941); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where
Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Burden];
Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940) [hereinafter
cited 7 as Distribution].
Today costs and counsel fees are essentially governed by The Supreme Court Costs
Rules of 1959 and attached appendices. 1 I. JACOB, P. ADAMS, J. NEAVE, & K. McGuFFIE,
THE ANNUAL PRACTICE 1999/210-2000 (1966) [hereinafter cited as RULES].
An exhaustive schedule of cost items is attached to the Rules. Id., app. 2 at
1999/319-46. Although there has been some litigation over questions arising from the
Rules and schedules and particular items omitted or included, see, e.g., In re Breeden's
Settlement Trusts, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 901 (concerning awards of fees for leading counsel);
Simpsons Motor Sales Ltd. v. Hendon Corp., [1965] 1 W.L.R. 112 (on calculating a
proper fee for preparation of a brief); Lawson v. Tiger, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 503 (defining
time spent at trial), there is little doubt that counsel fees are generally awarded to the
prevailing party unless considerations of equity require otherwise.
Costs in the Supreme Court are taxed by three kinds of officers, a taxing master, a
registrar of the principal probate registry and the Admiralty registrar, RULES 12-(1), who
are empowered to tax "the costs of or arising out of any cause or matter in the Supreme
Court." Id. 12-(1)-(a). The discretion of the taxing master in awarding costs is considerable, although limited to "necessary or proper" items, id. 28-(2). "Proper" has been
interpreted to include not only strictly necessary costs, but also those which are reasonably incurred for the purpose of the litigation. See Societe Anonyme Pecheries Ostendaises
v. Merchants Marine Ins. Co., [1928] 1 K.B.750.
To receive the appropriate amount of cost recovery, the winning solicitor sends his
bill to the losing solicitor. If a dispute arises and no agreement can be reached, the bill is
then sent to a master, who "taxes" it, disallowing or reducing any items he considers
unnecessary or excessive under the circumstances. The cost of taxing the bill is also
covered by a rule: if less than one-sixth of the bill is disallowed, the party challenging the
bill must bear that cost. If, however, the bill is reduced by more than one-sixth, the party
offering the bill must pay.
For a complete discussion of the inner workings of the English practice see R.
JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND (5th ed. 1967).
8 One commentator persuasively reasons that "a legal system which refuses an
innocent party full compensation for expenses incurred in asserting his right necessarily
denies him full redress for the injury he has suffered." Burden supra note 6, at 1216.
Similarly, the Massachusetts Judicial Council has posed a provocative question:
On what principle of justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public
highway recover his doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill? And on what principle
ofjustice is a defendant who has been wrongfully haled into court made to pay
out of his own pocket the expense of showing that he was wrongfully sued?
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to enable lower- and middle-class litigants to bring meritorious
small claims; 9 or to prevent wealthier litigants from manipulating
harassment and delay to threaten spiraling costs and force
opponents-even those with just claims or defenses-into submission. 10
The American Rule for the recovery of attorney's fees has
been challenged unavailingly on numerous occasions in both
state and federal courts." The courts, while adamantly adhering
to the Rule, have continually failed to critically evaluate the
justifications for its perpetuation. Since some writers have described the American Rule as merely a "historical accident,"12
this tendency to regard it uncritically as a universal truth is
particularly unfortunate.
B. Attorney's Fee Awards in Other Jurisdictions

In virtually every country outside the United States, courts
have awarded and continue to award attorney's fees to the
prevailing party in ordinary lawsuits as an item of compensatory
damage or cost necessary to a full and just recovery. In late
Roman law, under the guiding hand of Justinian, the duty of
paying legal costs, including even such extrajudicial expenses as
traveling costs and advocate's fees, 13 functioned as a penalty for
groundless litigation. In French civil practice the "general principle" was early established that a losing litigant should "be
adjudged to pay all costs, without exception."' 4 And according to
the ancient Sea Law in Sweden, a losing party was required to
reimburse a successful litigant for his reasonable outlays in the
action. A judgment was, in fact, deemed incomplete without a
determination of the award of costs; none was to be denied "his
reasonable expenses.' 5
According to Pollock and Maitland, before the time of
Edward I, although it was "highly probable" that in some cases a
successful plaintiff "might often under the name of 'damages'
obtain a compensation which would cover the costs of litigation
as well as all other harm that he had sustained,"' 6 this was
usually not the case in an action for land, in which neither
First Report Of The Judicial Council Of Massachusetts, 11 MASS. L.Q. 1, 64 (1925).
See
also Kuenzel, supra note 6; Stoebuck, supra note 6.
9
See, e.g., Cheatham, A Lauyer When Needed: Legal Services For The Middle Classes, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 973 (1963); Ehrenzweig, supra note 4; Note, Providing Legal Services For
the Middle Class In Civil Matters, 26 U. Prrr. L. RFv. 811 (1965).
10 See, e.g., Avilla, supra note 6.
12 See notes 30-46 infra & accompanying text.
E.g., Goodhart, supra note 6.
13 A. ENGELMANN, supra note 3, at 403.
14 Id. 726 (emphasis in original).
15d. 859-60.
16 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY Or"ENGLISH LAW 597 (2d ed. 1968).
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damages nor costs could be gotten. It was thus only under statute
that a victorious defendant could claim costs. 1 7 Indeed, no costs
were allowed to either party at common law. If the plaintiff
failed to recover, he was amerced (punished by a fine) for his
false complaint (profalsoclamore). If the plaintiff did recover, the
defendant-though in misericordia for unjustly detaining the
plaintiff's debt-was not additionally taxed with the expenses of
litigation."' Public opinion, however, gradually stirred by the
consequent hardships of litigation, resulted in enactment of the
Statute of Gloucester, 19 a 1278 legislative fiat grounded in the
theory that the damages allowed against a defendant in misericordia were insufficient either to discourage the bringing of improvident defenses or to make the plaintiff whole. Although the
statute dealt specifically only with the cost of the writ in actions
for land, it was liberally interpreted to provide for all reasonable
legal expenditures of plaintiffs, including their attorney's fees.2 °
Provision for awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants
came more slowly, but was accomplished by 1606.21
C. American Development
The English practice of allowing fee awards to a prevailing
litigant, one option clearly available to the legal establishment in
colonial America, was quickly rejected. Curiously enough, it
appears that early courts in colonial America routinely awarded
22
all costs, including the fees of counsel, to the successful litigant.
One explanation offered for the historic abandonment of this
practice is that later settlers soon developed hostility and distrust
for legal practitioners. This colonial attitude, toward lawyers has
been well described:
In every one of the Colonies, practically throughout the
Seventeenth Century, a lawyer or attorney was a character of disrepute and of suspicion, of whose standing
17Id.

18 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372 (1851). See also HULLOCK, THE LAW
OF COSTS 1 (1793).
19 Watson, A Rationale Of The Law Of Costs, 16 CENrr. L.J. 306 (1883) (citing 6 Edw. 1,
ch. 10 (1278)).
2 Id. 307.
21 4 Jac. I, ch. 3 (1606). For an excellent, insightful history of the development of
modem English practice in taxing costs against a losing litigant, see Goodhart, supra note
6, at 851-54. Much historical material contained in this Comment has been liberally
borrowed from this widely cited source.
For a brief overview of the mechanics of modem British practice in awarding
attorney's
fees, see note 7 supra.
22
See, e.g., Evrell v. Bradstret, 3 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS, COLONY OF
THE MASSACHusETrs BAY 163 (1666) (published in 1928); Clarke v. Davis, id. at 130
(1662); Hakins v. Gooden, id. at 86 (1660). There appears, however, some split in opinion
whether such practice was typical of even the mid-seventeenth century. Compare Distribution, supra note 6, with Ehrenzweig, supra note 4.
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or power in the community the ruling class .
was extremely jealous. In many of the Colonies, persons actinF as attorneys were forbidden to receive any
fee ....
Since lawyers were regarded with such disdain, it is not
altogether surprising that early colonists did not choose to promote the economic health of the profession by allowing courts to
award attorney's fees to a prevailing party. Distrust of the
American bar was aggravated by the belief that the corpus of law
was composed not of technical elegances, but of simple rules
easily comprehensible by anyone, and the suspicion that a lawyer
was an unnecessary luxury.
The frontier experience was, moreover, extraordinarily
influential in the development of early American jurisprudence;2 4 as Dean Pound explained, the spirit of the American pioneer, who scorned the notion of scientific law and a
learned bar, left an indelible mark on the development of both
procedural and substantive law. 25 The popular view of the solitary folk-hero fighting for his rights2 6 played a significant role
in the emergence of the unique American Rule.
Furthermore, in the years immediately following the Revolution, resentment developed in this country for anything English. In fact, the legal system so reacted against John Bull that in
the courts of New Hampshire there arose a rule against English
citations. 27 This conscious attempt to purge English traditions
from the American legal system, taken with fierce frontier individualism, made it unlikely that America would adopt a rule
which routinely awarded attorney's fees.
Professor Ehrenzweig has, however, suggested that the
American departure from English fee practice may have occurred for less rational reasons than those suggested above. As the
frontier moved westward, he notes, American life became increasingly centralized, and less and less emphasis was placed on
individualism. As uniformity and consistency of law became a
major goal of reformers, disrespect for legal practitioners diminished; as the law grew more complex, their services were
recognized as a necessity and not a luxury. The complete rejection of English jurisprudence which marked the early postRevolutionary years abated as the wounds of war healed.
23 C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4 (1911).
14 R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 112-38 (1921).
25
Id. 124.
26
1d. 145.
27

Id. 117. Dean Pound explains: "The citation of English decisions in the opinions of
the courts ... greatly exasperated the radical element. What were these precedents but

the rags of despotism, who were the judges that rendered them but tyrants, sycophants,
oppressors of the people and enemies of liberty." Id. 116-17.
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Reflecting these societal changes, the early nineteenth-century
legal community, according to Ehrenzweig, tried the British
rule. In many states, legal fees were-under statutory
authority 28-awarded to the prevailing party as an item of cost.
Such fees were, however, strictly controlled, never adjusted to
meet realistic needs, and, even when first adopted, never more
than nominal in amount. Consequently, Professor Ehrenzweig
suggests, it is legislative abandonment which has, over time,
resulted in the American Rule, 2a9 rule therefore best described as
merely a "historical accident.
Often taken for a maxim graven in stone, the American
Rule may not only be an historical legislative accident, but may as
well owe its continued existence to a fundamental error in the
judicial process. For judicial preoccupation with stare decisis, not
judicial acceptance of the Rule itself, is primarily responsible for
the present American Rule of attorney's -fees.
In what appears to be the first Supreme Court statement on
the subject, the Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman3" rejected an
argument that a requested $1600 attorney's fee ought to be
included as part of the recovery as a legitimate item of damage
necessary to make the prevailing litigant whole. While admitting
that its decision was not wholly satisfactory, the Court chose
precedent over policy, asserting: "The general practice of the
United States is in oposition [sic] to [the allowance of attorney's
fees] . . . and even if that practice were not strictly correct in
principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is
changed, or modified, by statute."'
This conservative reasoning typifies the judicial analysis
which has followed, to justify adherence down to the present to a
rule of law that was arguably "not strictly correct in principle"
nearly two hundred years ago.
In 1851 the Supreme Court was again, in Day v. Woodworth, 32 given an opportunity to pass on the legitimacy of awarding attorney's fees as an item of compensatory damages. Again
it failed to amend, overturn or even explore the wisdom of
28 See, e.g., Act of Dec. 23, 1820, ch. 48, § 2, 8 N.H. Laws 1003, 1006; Act of May 14,
1840, ch. 386, §§ 2, 3, [1840] N.Y. Laws 327-30; Act of Feb. 22, 1821, ch. 4954, § 2,
(1821] Pa. Laws 367.
29 Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 799. Professor Ehrenzweig insists that:
It was this mistake probably that caused lawyers and courts, when rising living
costs began to obscure the real purpose of the statutory amounts of "costs,'
gradually to forget the meaning of those amounts. And it was this process of
gradual forgetting rather than a deep-seated moral argument that has apparendy caused the abolition of the prevailing party's right to the recovery of his
counsel fees.
Id. 799.
30 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
3I Id. at 306.
32 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
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the American Rule. Admitting that there was "no doubt" that
in America "legal taxed costs are far below the real expenses
incurred by the litigant," the Court 33simply concluded that such
expenses were "all the law allows.1

By 1872, although continuing to cite to Arcambel and Day
when denying attorney's fee awards, specifically in the patent area,34 the Court seems to have felt compelled to justify
maintaining the American Rule. Apparently adopting Dean
Wigmore's "sporting theory" of early American justice, 3 5 the
Court asserted that the Rule placed "[t]he parties . . . upon a
footing of equality. '36 The Court also suggested that the lack of
any "fixed standard by which the honorarium can be measured" 37
justified the American Rule; the Court foresaw a possibility of
"animated and protracted" litigation over the question of the
"proper amount" and noted the "delicacy" required in "scal[ing]
down the charges. '3 8 Furthermore, fear of abuse seemed to the
Court to justify disallowance of all fee awards. It noted with
apparent alarm that "[s]ome counsel demand much more," that
"[s]ome clients are willing to pay much more," and that "[m]ore
counsel may be employed than necessary. '3 9 For all of these
reasons, the Court concluded that the "principle of disallowance
rest[ed] on a solid foundation," and that a contrary rule would
be "forbidden by the analogies of the law and sound public
'4 0
policy.
Just six years later, the Court again spoke directly to the
issue of fee awards. 41 This time it offered a novel defense of the
American Rule in an action for malicious prosecution: attorney's
fees could not be included as normal items of damages since they
were not, the Court suggested, proximately caused by the actions
of the defendant; it was not foreseeable that one would obtain
42
the aid of a lawyer when criminally prosecuted.
More recently the Court has continued to embrace the rule
first announced in Arcambel. Some additional justifications for its
perpetuation were suggested in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
'3Id. at 372 (emphasis added).

v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 230, 231 (1872).
35 See R. POUND, supra note 24, at 127. Dean Pound describes the sporting theory as
the idea that 'justice is a game to be played to the bitter end," in which the combatants
should be put on an entirely equal basis. See also Saint Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn.
355 (1857).
36
Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872).
37
Id.
34Oelrichs

38

39

1d.

Id.

40Jd

Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878).
The Court explained that "[the fees of counsel in prosecting this case" were not
natural consequences of the defendants' actions "in suing out the decree and warrant in
bankruptcy. They were not what the defendants ought to have foreseen." Id. at 197.
41
4
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Maier Brewing Co. 4 3 In an 8-1 decision 44 delivered by Chief
Justice Warren, the Court asserted, in support of the American
Rule, that "since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be
penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit," that
"the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions
to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees
of their opponents' counsel," and that "the time, expense, and
difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of...
reasonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for
judicial administration. 4 5 In an even more recent Court statement on attorneys' fees Mr. Justice Brennan cited the American
Rule almost offhandedly, merely stating that "the traditional
American rule ordinarily disfavors the allowance of attorneys'
"
fees ....
Thus the Supreme Court has fully adopted a rule first
announced in 1796 by a Court which admitted the possible
unsoundness of its own position. While justifications have concededly been offered-in its continued support over the years, the
courts have tended to rely heavily on early cases as compelling
and authoritative support for the rule,
without ever examining
47
frontally its essential underpinnings.
43 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
41 Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on a separate ground.
45 386 U.S. at 718 (citations omitted).
"
47 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
The state courts too have examined the attorney's fee issue through somewhat
darkened lenses. For randomly selected examples of instances of state court denials of fee
awards either as an item of compensatory damage or as an item of cost in the absence of
statutory or equitable authority, see Penney v. Pritchard, 255 Ala. 13, 49 So. 2d 782
(1950); Le Favve v. Dimond, 46 Cal. 2d 868, 299 P.2d 8 8 (1956); Reter v. Davenport,
R.I. & N.W. Ry., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952); Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665,
365 P.2d 181 (1961); Winkler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 37 N.W. 607 (1858).
Pennsylvania experience seems for the most part to reflect the judicial history of
other states which have passed upon the question. In one early and aberrational
Pennsylvania action on the case, in which a father sued for the loss of his son's services
caused by the youth's broken leg, Wilt v. Vickers, 8 Watts 227 (Pa. 1839), the court
reasoned that the plaintiff should "recover in damages whatever sum may be requisite to
compensate him for his loss occasioned by the conduct of the defendant," and that
"compensation cannot be made without taking into the estimate the trouble and expense
incurred by the plaintiff in prosecuting his suit," since if the plaintiff were allowed only
damages equal to the actual loss of service, "he, instead of being compensated, would be a
loser, notwithstanding his right to a recovery." Id. at 235-36. Such analysis, reflecting the
theory that one ought to be made whole through the judicial process, see, e.g., Stoebuck,
supra note 6, was overruled just nine years later by a case bottomed in what might best be
termed judicial cynicism, Good v. Mylin, 8 Pa. 51 (1848), with Chief Justice Gibson
asserting that it was a "fallacy to suppose that every successful plaintiff has a right to be
made whole by a verdict which is, at best, only an approximation to perfect justice." The
Chief Justice was not troubled by the recognition that "[tihere is many a right ... not
worth the trouble and expense of enforcing it," since "[t]o pay for expenses and trouble,
in order to make it valuable, would open a field of inquiry often more extensive than the
issue raised by the pleadings, and make it the principal battleground." Id. at 56.
Additionally Chief Justice Gibson expressed a fear of possibly protracted litigation in
much the manner of the Supreme Court some three years later, see text accompanying
note 37 supra.
In another noteworthy case, Chief Justice Gibson addressed the possible abuses of a
system in which attorney's fees might be routinely awarded, cf. text accompanying note
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D.

Exceptions to the American Rule

Though black lettered and enduring, the American Rule is
not without its exceptions. Even absent express statutory authority, for example, there exists in equity judicial license to grant
attorney's fees in particular cases. In one early twentieth-century
Eighth Circuit case, Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern

Railway Co., 48 Judge Booth found this equity power to have

originated in early English statutory law, 49 and to extend to cases
in which "gross charges of fraud and misconduct have been
made and not sustained"; in which "the main ground of the suit
is false, unjust, vexatious, wanton,
or oppressive" or in which "a
'50
fiduciary relationship exists.
In this country, the Supreme Court followed the English
practice in promulgating the Rules of Practice for the Courts of
Equity of the United States, 51 which provide that: "In all cases
where the rules prescribed by this Court, or by the Circuit Court,
do not apply, the practice of the Circuit Courts shall be regulated
by the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England. 52
Thus the federal courts have since their inception 53 been empowered to award costs. Probably in deference to the American
Rule, however, courts of equity have been conservative in the
exercise of that inherent power in private litigation. Current
experience indicates that fee awards will be granted "only in
exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice. '54 Thus
equity has--except in admiralty suits in which attorney's fees
have historically been viewed as an item of compensatory
damages 55-typically awarded attorney's fees only in extraor-

38 supra, expressing concern that if fees were allowed, "[c]lients would pay liberally out of
the pockets of their adversaries .... " Alexander v. Herr's Ex'rs, 11 Pa. 537, 539 (1849).
See also Winton v. Morrs, 87 Pa. 77 (1878).
Like the United States Supreme Court, moreover, Pennsylvania courts over time
neglected to provide reasons for the existence of their rule regarding attorney's fees;
subsequent cases began to depend purely on hoary precedents. In one not atypical late
19th century case, the court cited Alexander as having so "fully discuss[ed] this question,"
that it felt "nothing further" needed be added. Commonwealth v. Meyer, 170 Pa. 380,
384, 32 A. 1044, 1045 (1895). As time passed, decisions adverted to the settled rule
denying counsel fees. See, e.g., Kling Appeal, 433 Pa. 118, 249 A.2d 552 (1969);
Drummond v. Drummond, 414 Pa. 548, 200 A.2d 887 (1964); Smith v. Equitable Trust
Co., 215 Pa. 413, 64 A. 591 (1906).
48
49 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928).
Id. at 240.
59Id. at 241.
5 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v (1822).
52 Equity R. 33, id. at xiii.
'3 For a compilation of authorities in which the equity power has been approved and
followed by early federal courts, see Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 28
F.2d 233, 241 n.2 (8th Cir. 1928).
54 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939). See also Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (overriding
considerations of justice may compel such a result).
',5 See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (due to respondent's
"willful and persistent' recalcitrance).
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dinary cases, such as a civil contempt action for willful disobedience to a court order, 56 or cases ih which a party's actions can be
characterized as clearly oppressive or vexatious. 57 The underlying theory 5 behind
the award of fees in equity is, in any event,
"punitive." 8
As a corollary to the award of attorney's fees in exceptional
cases in equity, the courts have created a "common fund" exception to the American Rule and awarded fees to a single party
acting on behalf of a larger class. Courts have found it fundamentally unjust to tax the representative of the class, who has
worked for others as well as himself, with an attorney's fee which
has benefited others who have incurred no such expense, 59 and
have thus awarded the prevailing party his reasonable costs.
In addition, Congress has given specific statutory authorization for awarding "reasonable" attorney's fees in certain classes of
private litigation to assist the enforcement of certain laws, encouraging the bringing of particular types of claims and discouraging unjust and unfounded defenses. Reasonable fees are
thus awarded in antitrust cases, 60 under the Communications
Act, 6 ' for violations of the copyright laws,62 under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 63 for certain violations of the interstate commerce
laws,6 4 under the Merchant Marine Act, 65 in cases brought under
the Packers and Stockyards Act, 6 6 under the patent laws, 67 for
56

See, e.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426 (1923). But
see Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 481 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973).
'7 See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946); Schlein v.
Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (gross fraud); Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945); Inre Swartz, 130 F.2d
229 (7th Cir. 1942) (oppressive motions). For fees awarded as compensatory damages in
trademark cases against parties guilty of bad faith, fraud or unconscionable conduct, see
Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle
Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941). For a depiction of the broad expansion of this
"bad faith" exception in public interest litigation, see notes 157-63 infra & accompanying
text.
58 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). For an analysis of a unique stance taken by New
Jersey courts, see Lynch, The New Jersey Supreme CourtAnd The Counsel Fees Rule, 4 SETON
HALL L. Rv. 19 (1972).
59 Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 533-37 (1882). See also Rude v. Buchhalter,
286 U.S. 451 (1932) (suit to preserve a trust fund); Harrison v. Perea, 168 U.S. 311
(1897) (suit to recover assets of decedent's estate); Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 85 (1st
Cir. 1959) (stockholder's suit); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 195 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.
1951) (consumer's suit). The notion of what defines a common fund was extended in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-97 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939). See also Note, The Allocation Of Attorney's Fees After
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. R~v. 316 (1971); notes 217-25 infra &
accompanying text.
60 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
6147 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
62 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970).
6329 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
6449 U.S.C. §§ 8, 908(b) (1970).
6' 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970).
66 7 U.S.C. § 210(0 (1970).
67 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970).
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actions under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 68
under the Railway Labor Act, 69 for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act,7 0 under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act,71
and the Trust Indenture Act.7 2 A twenty dollar docket fee also is
73
generally awarded to the prevailing party.

In state courts, attorney's fees may be awarded to a wife,
whether or not successful, in a divorce action, in the discretion of
the trial court.74 Attorney's fees have also been awarded to a

litigant forced to defend an action as the result of the wrongful
conduct of others. For example, a land purchaser with covenants

of title whose title is successfully challenged by holders of adverse interests may recover fees in a subsequent action against
his warrantor.7 5 Similarly, at tort law, fees are recoverable by an
innocent maliciously prosecuted.7 6 These latter state common

law exceptions to the American Rule appear-unlike the divorce
exception-to be grounded in the concepts of punishment and
deterrence of misconduct and oppressiveness.
In Alaska, recovery of attorney's fees is allowed generally by

statute. This unique practice arises from a statute enacted by
Congress in 1900,77 for which there is a dearth of available

legislative history. One can at best surmise that Congress may
have wished to encourage attorneys to relocate to the Alaskan
territory, or that it felt that the law could best be enforced if
attorney's fees were routinely awarded. For whatever historic

reason the unique Alaskan rule was born, Alaska has preserved
the rule upon attaining statehood, and Alaskan courts continue
to authorize attorney's fees7 8 according to an official schedule.79
68 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970).
6945 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970).
70 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970).
71 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970).
72 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1970).
73 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (1970).
74
Cf. Brandel v. Brandel, 69 Ill. App. 2d 264, 216 N.E.2d 21 (1966) (dictum); Bahre
v. Bahre, 140 Ind. App. 246, 211 N.E.2d 627 (1965) (dictum); Clifford v. Clifford, 354
Mass. 545, 238 N.E.2d 522 (1968) (dictum); Hammond v. Hammond, 210 Pa. Super.
386, 233 A.2d 628 (1967) (dictum). See also Shima v. Shima, 139 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir.
1943).
7 See, e.g., Seitz v. People's Say. Bank, 140 Mich. 106, 103 N.W. 545 (1905).
7
1Cf. Biggans v. Hajoca Corp., 94 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 185 F.2d 982 (3d
Cir. 771950).
Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 509, 31 Stat. 415.
78ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1972) reads: "Except as otherwise provided by statute,
the supreme court shall determine by rule or order what costs, if any, including attorney
fees, shall be allowed the prevailing party in any case.
79 ALAS. R. Civ. P. 82(a) provides:
(1) Unless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs, the following
schedule of attorney's fees will be adhered to in fixing such fees for the party
recovering any money judgment therein, as part of the costs of the action
allowed by law:

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:636

Nevada authorizes the award of counsel fees in cases in
which the plaintiff has sought a recovery of under $10,000.00.8o
The legislative history of this rule is lacking, although it appears
to have its origins in a belief that larger claims are likely brought
by litigants8 more able to afford litigation and to pay their own
attorneys. '
E. An Argument for a New American Rule
Taken one by one, the purported justifications for the
continued existence of the American Rule add up to little in
today's world, in which rugged individualism is a dwindling
commodity, law is no longer-if it ever was-a collection of
simple rules for judges to administer "according to their common sense and the light of nature,"82 and an attorney is not a
luxury but a necessity for the successful maintenance of a cause
3
of action or defense.a
1. Makeweight Opposition
Certain historical objections to implementation of a system
of universal indemnity for attorney's fees seem little more than
frivolous in 1974. The objection that the expense of counsel is
too remote and unforeseeable to be includible as an item of
damage,8 4 for example, seems easily dispensed with as as best

First
Next
Next
Over

$ 2,000
$ 3,000
$ 5,000
$10,000

Attorney's Fees in Average Cases
Contested
Without Trial
25%
20%
20%
15%
15%
12.5%
10%
7.5%

Non-Contested
15%
12.5%
10%
5%

Should no recovery be had, attorney's fees for the prevailing party may be fixed
by the court as a part of the costs of the action in its discretion, in a reasonable
amount.
(2) In actions where the money judgement is not an accurate criteria for
determining the fee to be allowed to the prevailing side, the court shall award a
fee commensurate with the amount and value of legal services rendered.
See also ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.015 (1972).
81 NEV. RZv. STAT. § 18.010(3) (1971) provides:
The court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to:
(a) The plaintiff as prevailing party when the plaintiff has not recovered more
than $10,000; or
(b) The counterclaimant as prevailing party when he has not recovered more
than $10,000; or
(c) The defendant as prevailing party when the plaintiff has not sought recovery
in excess of $10,000.
"I Letter from Melvin D. Close, Jr., member of the Nevada bar, to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Aug. 24, 1973, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania.
82 R. POUND, supra note 24, at 113.

83The Supreme Court has confirmed this necessity with regard to the criminal
defendant, for whom access to the assistance of counsel is required by the Constitution.
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4
See note 42 supra & accompanying text.
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based upon antiquated assumptions. Today, when an attorney is
a basic necessity to the pursuit of legal redress, it would-for
better or for worse-require rare myopia for anyone to fail to
foresee that a litigant will be represented by an attorney, even if
the cost of the latter's services may be less than precisely foreseeable.
Another assertion, that to allow judges wide discretion in
awarding fees is contrary to the "general American conception of
a judiciary bound by fixed rules, '

85

seems undeserving of de-

tailed exposition and palpably incorrect, for our judicial system
is replete with examples of important judicial 86discretion, particularly in equity where discretion is the rule.
Similarly, the attitude that the legal system can only remotely approach perfect justice 87 seems flimsy modern support
for the American Rule. While verdicts may be only approximations of ideal justice, it does not logically follow that their
correctness will be increased by in effect adjusting them uniformly downward; nor that it is acceptable for valid legal rights
not to be worth the expense of their vindication. As Dean Pound
has suggested, a law which measures compensation in purely
monetary terms must almost by definition operate imperfectly as
to matters not easily measured in dollars. 88 In matters which
lend themselves to precise monetary measurement, however, the
law can approach and should strive toward the nearly perfect
result. Since attorney's fees are for the most part easily measurable, there is no basis in reason for the law to abandon all
attempts at full compensation in regard to this aspect of damages.
2. Likelihood of Penalizing Innocents
The notion that no one should be penalized simply for

defending or prosecuting an action 8 9 is superficially attractive

but not in itself a compelling defense of the American Rule. The
burden of paying a fee award would, after all, be borne only by
the losing litigant. We are committed to the conclusion that the
courtroom loser is more often a wrongdoer than an innocent,
and that it would be unworkable or prohibitively expensive to fix
responsibility more carefully case by case. 90 One commentator
-suggesting that a judge is "as like as not to do injustice when
85Goodhart, supra note 6, at 877.
See, e.g., Gordon v. Hartford Sterling Co., 350 Pa. 277, 38 A.2d 229 (1944);
Barndollar v. Groszkiewicz, 178 Pa. Super. 110, 113 A.2d. 154 (1955). See also text
accompanying
notes 48, 74 supra.
87
See note 53 supra.
88 R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 59 (1942).
81See text accompanying note 45 supra.
90 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 797.
86
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he seeks to do justice,"' would apparently deny the courts'
ability to arrive at a correct result in a given case, and thus find
justice to require that fees be borne by each litigant as in the
past. This essentially pessimistic assertion, however, was wellanswered by Professor Goodhart, who suggested that if justice
were indeed so much a matter of luck it might be advisable to
dispense with courts and lawyers altogether, since it would be
"cheaper, and certainly less dilatory, to spin a coin." 92
3. Effect on Litigation
The argument that the American Rule is necessary to encourage individuals to vindicate their legal rights93 is not so easily
dispensed with, for it directly contradicts one major argument
for abandoning the Rule. Although it has been said that the
"need to provide the individual with private law enforcing
power" makes rejection of the American Rule a "practical
necessity," 94 studies suggest that the English Rule does not invar95
iably encourage the disadvantaged to pursue their rights.
a. The Small Claimant
Rejection of the American Rule clearly should have the
effect of encouraging the person with a just but monetarily small
claim to seek redress. Current practice tends to deter the prosecution of even clearly meritorious small claims by litigants who
could at best recover less than the often high expenses of
counsel; the contingent fee, moreover, fails to promote such
claims, for even a fifty percent fee is unlikely to interest an
attorney if the claim is truly a small one. And what is true for
plaintiffs also holds for defendants: the cost of defending against
an unjust small claim may easily exceed the cost of simply paying
what is demanded. This result is distasteful, for it ranks legal
rights by dollar values, ignoring rights of unquestioned importance simply because they are monetarily small9 6 or incapable of
precise measurement.9 7 Were attorneys assured of recompense
for their time and service, emphasis would be placed on the
91 Satterthwaite, IncreasingCosts to be Paid by the Losing Party, 46 N.J.L.J. 133 (1923).
92Goodhart, supra note 6, at 877. See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 796.
93 See text accompanying note 45 supra; see also Kuenzel, supra note 6, at 82 (citing a
statement by the Judicial Council of California on the need to promote litigation).
94 Note, supra note 59, at 328.
95
See generally FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SUPREME COURT PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, July, 1953, Cmd. 8878, at 236, 246, 337 [hereinafter cited as EVERSHED
REPORT].
96

Cf Christensen, Aids in Meeting Legal Expenses, 37 FORD. L. REv. 383 (1969).
97 Injunctive relief in civil rights litigation may be as vital as its monetary value is
incalculable. See Note, Allowance of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 7 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 381 (1971).

19741

ATTORNEY'S FEES

merits of these small claims, which would almost inevitably be
promoted.
It must be remembered, however, that not all small claims
are clearly meritorious, and the impact of an English Rule of
attorney's fees might well be to discourage litigation of these
claims. 98 Similarly, the fear of a penalty upon loss of a small
claim may induce premature or unjust settlement where the
claimant is poor and the claim is less than open-and-shut. 99
Moreover, flooding the courts with even meritorious small
claims is not a goal for which there is broad support. Although in
frontier America it may have been national policy to encourage
individuals to submit disputes to the judicial process, 10 0 current
public policy favors settlement of disputes outside the courtroom.' 0 1 One of the greatest contemporary legal problems, in
fact, is that of monumental court congestion,' 0 2 a congestion
or to exact the
often manipulated to force unjust settlements
03
so-called nuisance value of frivolous claims.'
Given the growing availability of small claims courts' 0 4 it
may be not only acceptable but the course of wisdom to continue
a rule which in most cases deters small claimants from the
ordinary courts.
b.

The Poor Litigant

It is generally less than clear what effect adoption of a
system of assessing attorney's fees against losing litigants ("universal indemnity") would have upon the poor litigant. As it is,
the American Rule hardly seems to encourage him to vindicate
his legal rights.' 5 Rejection of the American Rule would likely
encourage assertion of clear legal rights with a high probability
of success but would add to the deterrence of the present system
in cases where the litigant's claim was novel or of arguable
worth.' 0 6 Since a poor man is likely to fear the prospect of
98See Mause, supra note 6, at 33-34.
991d. 31 n.23, 33-34. Cf. Letter from Melvin D. Close, Jr., member of the Nevada
bar, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Aug. 24, 1973, on file in Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania (noting divergence of opinion among Nevada legislators on the effects upon litigation which would result from a system indemnifying the
winning litigant).
105 R. POUND, supra note 88.
"I1 See Note, Use Of Taxable Costs To Regulate The Conduct Of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 78, 86-92 (1953) & sources cited. See also Kuenzel, supra note 6.
1 2
See ABA SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON COURT CONGESTION, TEN CURES FOR COURT
CONGESTION (1959).
103 Kuenzel, supra note 6, at 78.
104For a recent study of the operations of one such court, see Steadman &
Rosenstein, "Small Claims" Consumer Plaintiffs In the Philadelphia Municipal Court: An
Empirical Study, 121 U. Pa. L. Rxv. 1309 (1973).
I'5 See note 94 supra & accompanying text. But see EVERSHED REPORT, supra note 95,
at 238.
106See Mause, supra note 6, at 31-33, 36.
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paying both counsel more than a wealthy one,' 0 7 it would seem
likely that-except where completely judgment-proof-he would
often be manipulated into premature settlement.
It cannot be said confidently that the disadvantaged litigant's
rights are often well enough defined, either as to fact or law, that
the risk of such deterrence is acceptable. On the other hand,
in many cases in which the poor litigant's rights are clear,
legal representation is currently available thanks to the indigenously American "contingent fee arrangement."' 018 Though
illegal as champertous at common law and in England today, 0 9
and though tightly controlled and much maligned even in
America," 0 the contingent fee arrangement has been "summed
up in one phrase, '[t]he poor man's fee' "" and felt to give the
poor man the keys to the courthouse door.
4. A Modest Proposal
A system of universal indemnity would, it appears, discourage not only the small claimant and the poor litigant, but also the
bringing of suits or the imposition of defenses in new or complex
and largely unpredictable areas of law. In an essentially common
law country like ours, such a system would frustrate the vitality
and continued development of the law.
On balance, then, a system properly responding to the evils
of the present should focus squarely upon the elimination of
wrongful conduct, and seek to discourage abuse of existing legal
apparatus. This goal can best be achieved by judicial or legislative expansion of the existing bad faith exception to the AmeriId. 36.
108 For an exhaustive analysis of the role of the contingent fee in American jurispru107

dence,0 see F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964).

1 91d. 38. The Solicitor's Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 27, provides that:
Nothing in [the Act] "shall give validity to-(a) any purchase by a solicitor of the
interest, or any part of the interest, of his client in any action, suit or other

contentious proceeding; or (b) any agreement by which a solicitor retained or
employed to prosecute any action, suit or other contentious proceeding stipulates for payment only in the event of success ....
110 The contingent fee is, in fact, illegal in one state. F. MACKINNON, supra note 108,
at 39-41.
Major objections to such fee arrangements have been ethical ones. "The temptation
to make improper bargains," id. 160, has been specifically cited as one danger of the
contingent fee; likewise, the often exorbitant size of such fee recoveries has been pointed
to with an accusatory finger. Id.

160-67.

Some critics have noted the inherent conflcits of a system in which an attorney has
simultaneously a vested financial interest in the size and speed of the recovery, and near
complete control over the settlement of a suit, id. 196-98, and over potentially dilatory
trial tactics. Id. 200. Others have suggested that the contingent fee system may have
greatly contributed to the enormous court backlogs that exist today. Id. 201-02. Finally,
some have pointed to the ugly incentive to ambulance chasing, id. 203, heightened by
potentially enormous contingent awards.
IIIId. 160. See also Note, ContingentFee, Champerty or Champion?, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
15 (1972).
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can Rule. 1 12 Current practice, awarding fees only against the
most flagrant and obstinate violators of the law, fails to discourage wholly unfounded and entirely vexatious actions and defenses, which even a system favoring litigation over settlement
would abhor. It seems clear that, as the Massachusetts Judicial
Council has suggested, "[t]he possibility of having to pay the
lawyer's bills of both parties to the action makes a plaintiff think
twice before he sues out a writ and a defendant think twice
3
before he defends an action which ought not to be defended.""1
If litigants were made to know that all unnecessary delays
cost money-money that will be charged to their account should
they be shown to have litigated in bad faith-it can be
confidently predicted that dilatory tactics would lose favor, and
that respect for our legal apparatus would grow." 4 Furthermore, it seems not unlikely that litigation techniques would tend
to become streamlined, as each side in a contested action would
be encouraged, contrary to present practice, to minimize the
opposition's expenses. While our judicial system must seek to
encourage the just claim and the just defense, it need not do so
with maximum inefficiency. The wise employment of a system of
penalties upon unreasonable conduct is likely to open wider the
narrow gates of the law" 15 by deterring frivolous litigation and
spurring just settlement.
Although it is difficult to draw a bright line between reasonable and unreasonable courtroom conduct, there are sufficient
guidelines for legislatures to design a workable plan which can
be refined by the courts. In essence, it would seem that, as
Professor Mause suggests, the "key element" in determining a
litigant's reasonableness would be the "predictability of the
outcome"' " 1 6 of litigation undertaken or defenses interposed. In
"'2 See notes 48-58 supra & accompanying text.
113First Report

of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 MASS. L.Q. 1, 63 (1925).
Former Chief Justice Warren explained:
Today, because the legal remedies of many of our people can be realized only
after they have sallowed with the passage of time, they are mere forms ofjustice.
And, to the extent that this is so, there is created a disrespect for the law ....
ABA SPECIAL COMMISSION ON COURT CONGESTION: TEN CURES FOR COURT CONGESTION 7
(1959).
"' See R. POUND, supra note 88, at 58; Note, supra note 101. See also Cheatham, supra
114

note 9.

Cf. F. KAFKA, Before the Law, in THE PENAL COLONY 148 (1948). The position of the
disadvantaged litigant bears striking resemblance to Kafka's "man from the country" who
"prays for admittance to the Law." Though in time made aware of "a radiance that
streams inextinguishably from the gateway of the Law," fear, ignorance and intimidation
result in his coming to know only "the fleas in ...[the] fur collar" of the gatekeeper, and
in his reaching his end without ever having been admitted through a gateway reserved
only for him. Id. 148-50.
116 Mause, supra note 6, at 29. Professor Mause also analyzes an indemnity plan

structured upon the relative reasonableness of the loser's position; Mause examines
English, Swedish and German systems in considerable detail. Id. 46-50.
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designing legislation to codify such a principle, new attention to
a model statute proposed by Professor Stoebuck-premised
1
upon a broad conception of bad faith-would be desirable. 7
5. Fear of Abuse
One fear frequently voiced in defense of the status quo is
that a contrary rule would lend itself to rampant abuse." 8 While
it is indisputably true that some counsel demand more and some
clients pay more," 9 a system which awards fees clearly need not
unquestioningly reimburse all actual out-of-pocket costs. Just as
the English system has developed a rule whereby-regardless of
the outlays by a litigant for counsel-only costs determined to
have been necessary and proper for the successful completion of
litigation are allowed, 20 the American system can presumably
interpose sufficient review of fee awards
to allay fears that
12 1
attorneys would indulge in profiteering.
The fear of protracted litigation over the reasonableness of
attorney's fees 12 2 seems similarly unfounded. While some litigation certainly may ensue, the fact that the losing party in such
litigation must bear its costs will act as a deterrent to excessively
prolonged controversy. Litigating the adequacy of an award of
attorney's fees is, after all, inherently self-defeating for at least
one party. Should the system of fee calculations proposed in
this Comment'2 3 give rise to abuse, moreover, the English
25
mechanism 24 or an even simpler system of fee schedules
could be adopted to minimize litigation over fees. At any rate,
the benefit resulting from a system of reasonable awards would
outweigh the cost of the technical problems which would attend
its adoption.
F. Conclusion
The reasons which may once have justified the "historical
accident" which is the American Rule for private litigation no
117 Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 211. Professor Stoebuck would favor a system which
routinely awards fee except when an action turns upon a question of law not previously
decided. When the prevailing party is adjudged to have prosecuted or defended an
action in bad faith, obstinately refused to settle, or otherwise abused the legal apparatus,
he would allow a judge to diminish or eliminate the award to that party.
18
See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.

19Id.

120 See note 7 supra.
21 For a discussion of the difficulties of determining a "reasonable" fee award, see
Section IV, infra.
122 See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
3
12
See notes 387-423 infra & accompanying text.
124 See note 7 supra.
125Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 211-18. See also Geller, UnreasonableRefusal To Settle and
Calendar Congestion-SuggestedRemedy, COMMITTEE REPORTS OF COMPARATIVE "LAW DiviSION, PROCEEDINGS ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION 134 (1962).
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longer carry persuasive weight. The present American Rule has
no compelling justifications; it breeds abuse and harbors rank
inequity. A contrary rule broadening the scope of the currently
narrow bad faith exception would foster out of court settlement,
relieve court congestion, discourage expensive and dilatory
courtroom tactics, discourage nuisance suits and meritless defenses, and encourage the pursuit of claims which are small but
clearly just. Since needed change is not likely to come from the
courts, which have proved themselves for over two centuries to
be predisposed to perpetuate "a lingering remnant of the old
barbaric dispensation," sacrificing "philosophy, justice and common sense . . .to formal and senseless precedents,"'126 it would
appear that legislative action has become necessary.
II.

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND THE PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

A. Introduction
The recent increase in public interest litigation has brought
to the attention of the legal community as never before the
problem of equal access to the judicial system.' 27 Implicit in
the concept of due process, equality before the courts and under
the law is a value basic to our Constitution, 12 8 and equal access to
the courts is a prerequisite to achieving this goal. It is therefore
surprising to find that only in recent years has there been
12

6 Watson, A Rationale Of The Law Of Costs, 16 CENT. L.J. 306, 307 (1883).

127 With

startling suddenness the legal profession has recently come to realize
that a society can guarantee equal justice only by providing all citizens with

effective access to the institutions by which justice is obtained and that for
millions of Americans the unavailability of lawyers' services has made justice
inaccessible.
Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L.

REv. 805 (1967).
The democratic promise of "Equal Justice Under Law" necessarily requires
equal access to legal institutions. In this Nation, perhaps more than in any other,
access to legal institutions presupposes access to lawyers.

Hearings on Attorney's Fees Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 798 (Oct. 4, 1973) (Testimony of J.
Kline, Esq., of Public Advocates, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); ABA SECTION ON
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES, THE PRIVATE LAW FIRM AND PRO BONO PUBLIC

A RESPONSIVE MERGER (1971); Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the
Professioni-ThePublic Interest in PublicInterest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Halpern &
Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practiceat the Centerfor
Law and Social Policy, 59 GEo. L. REv. 1095 (1971).
PROGRAMS:

128 Equality before the courts is a necessary condition for impartial adjudication, a
central element in the achievement of "fairness" in due process.
[A] just and correct result-which is precisely what the adversary system is
designed to produce-is least likely when there is a marked difference in the
quality of legal representation available to respective adversaries or in the
financial resources that the respective adversaries can devote to the presentation
of their side of the case.
Hearings, supra note 127, at 841 (Testimony of D. Flannery, Esq.).
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widespread recognition of the economic barriers to gaining access to the courts for the plaintiff of moderate or limited means,
seeking to vindicate or challenge public policy goals. 12 9 Foremost
among the issues raised by this circumstance is the propriety of
court awarded attorney's fees.
Although traditional equitable exceptions to the American
Rule against the award of counsel fees 130 to the successful
plaintiff are well established, 13 1 pressure for more liberal fee
shifting has been mounting since the 1968 Supreme Court
decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 132 a suit challenging racial discrimination in a chain of restaurants. The Court
there adopted a new theory for awarding fees under Title II
(public accommodations) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'" 3 The
statute provided for an award of fees within the discretion of the
court, 1 34 but the Supreme Court used reasoning that was to

prove more far-reaching.
When a plaintiff brings an action under [Title II], he
cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he
does so not for himself alone but also as a "private
attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys'
fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to
advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive
powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore
enacted the provsion for counsel fees-not simply to
penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments
they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to en"'See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) ("[T]his'court has
seldom been asked to view access to the courts as an element of due process.").
It is important to note that the impact of fee awards in public interest litigation is by
no means limited to the poor. As J. Kline testified at the Senate Hearings:
But it is not simply the poor who are without legal assistance in public
interest cases, and this is a fact not widely recognized ....
[O]ne of the central
features that distinguishes public interest litigation from other suits is that the
final judgment will affect not only the parties, but a broad segment of the public
at large. Furthermore, such litigation normally seeks only injunctive and declaratory relief, not damages. Therefore, rarely will an individual-even a
wealthy individual-be likely to seek out and pay counsel to commence costly
litigation to vindicate, not his own private rights, but widely shared public rights.
In other words, any single individual's interest in the enforcement of broad
public rights is normally diffused in the public interest. In these circumstances it
is not rational for any person to attempt to capture his or her minute portion of
the aggregate good by using personal funds to pay the full cost of enforcing the
mutual right.
Hearings, supra note 127, at 801 (footnote omitted).
130 For an extended discussion of the Rule, see notes 1-47 supra & accompanying
text.
131 See notes 157-63 infra & accompanying text.
132 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
133 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
134Id. § 2000a-3(b) (quoted in note 21 infra).
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courage individuals injured by racial discrimination to
seek judicial relief under Title II.
It follows that one who succeeds in obtaining an
injunction under that Title should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render
135
such an award unjust.
The lower federal courts have applied this relatively new
rationale for awarding attorney's fees to an increasingly broad
range of cases, including lawsuits in which no statutory provision
for award of counsel fees existed,'1 36 the plaintiff was not obligated to pay counsel,13 7 where the suit was for damages, 13 8 or
the award was to a successful defendant. 3 9 Some courts have
even awarded fees to an unsuccessful plaintiff. 140 At the present
time, then, the private attorney general rationale for awarding
fees is rapidly gaining acceptance in the federal courts. In fact,
since the decision in Piggie Park, few federal appellate decisions
have reversed lower court rulings awarding fees based on the
private attorney general theory, and some have reversed, or
remanded for further consideration, the failure of a lower court
to award fees.' 4 ' The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
one such case, Bradley v. School Board,i 42 which is apparently the
only recent decision reversing a lower court award of fees.
Because it provides a means of helping to equalize access to
the courts for groups seeking to litigate issues of importance to
the public, the private attorney general theory of fee shifting
seems especially attractive. However, there are conceptual
difficulties that threaten the continued vitality of this new
theory. 43 Before discussing these problems, it will be helpful to
review the background and development of the theory.
390 U.S. at 402 (footnotes omitted).
See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (action for
racial discrimination in the sale of real estate brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)).
137See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (plaintiffs represented
by foundation-funded public interest law firm and by government-funded Legal Services
attorneys).
1'8 See Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971) (damages awarded in action
against police alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights).
"3 See United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871 (D.R.I. 1970) (successful defendant
was subjected to a meritless prosecution brought by the United States under the public
accommodations section (Title II) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
def See McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971) (fees assessed against
defendants who prevailed on appeal, where plaintiff was forced to go to court to obtain
statement of reasons to which he was constitutionally entitled); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364
F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (fee award to unsuccessful plaintiffs in environmental
action because legal action spurred improvements in environmental related aspects of
design for real estate development).
41 See Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Jinks v. Mays, 464 F.2d 1223
(5th Cir. 1972); Ojeda v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1972); McEnteggart v. Cataldo,
451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir.
1971).
142 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 937 (1973).
43
See notes 210-25 infra & accompanying text.
13
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Background of Fee Award Theories

1. Factors Influencing Their Development
Judge Jerome Frank first coined the phrase "private attorney general" in a 1943 case involving a private citizen's standing
14 4
to sue a public official for violation of a specific statutory duty.
But the theory was not used to support the shifting of fees until
several other factors had appeared.
First, fee shifting in commercial litigation under federal
regulatory statutes-such as antitrust actions' 45 -provided a successful example of the use of congressionally-authorized awards
as an incentive for private enforcement of public policy. Second,
the central role of litigation in the civil rights movement, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,14 6 led to congressional
enactment of attorney's fee provisions in the various civil rights
acts of the 1960's.147 Such provisions probably reflect the legisla144See Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot,
320 U.S. 707 (1943). The court reasoned:
Instead of designating the Attorney General, or some other public officer, to
bring such proceedings [to prevent another official from acting in violation of
his statutory powers], Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on
any non-official person, or on a designated group of non-official persons,
authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his
statutory powers; . ... there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from
empowering any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such
a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such
persons,
so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.
,.1 See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). This is perhaps the best known
statute authorizing the award of fees to the successful plaintiff. The statute provides for a
mandatory award.
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
For other examples of statutory provisions for award of counsel fees in commercial
litigation, see notes 60-73 supra & accompanying text.
146 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147 For example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable
for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 takes a slightly different approach:
The court may grant as relief [for violations of a right secured by the Act], as it
deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages
and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs and
reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff; Provided, That the
said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume said
attorney's fees.
Id. § 3612(c).
It can be argued that the original text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) also provided for
the award of attorney's fees. Section 1983 was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and is
derived from the Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The original uncodified ch. 22
provided that plaintiffs suing under that provision be granted the same remedies as were
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tive perception that the rights involved were necessarily to be
dependent on private enforcement and that, where the economic
disparities between parties were likely to be great, the creation of
federally protected rights would be meaningless without fee
shifting. 143 A third factor was the liberalization and expansion by
the courts of the rules of standing. 149 The result has been to
permit greater access to the judicial system for those who would
represent the public interest or challenge the legality of government action. Access has also been improved by a fourth factor,
the liberalization of the rules governing class actions. 150 These
rules have changed to facilitate access to the courts for those
whose claims would be uneconomical to litigate individually.
Finally, the growing number of lawyers seeking to represent
previously unrepresented groups in "public interest" litigation
has provided additional impetus for fee shifting under the
private attorney general rationale. Legal Aid, the OEO Legal
Services Program, private pro bono programs, and "public interest" law firms have all served to greatly increase the amount of
"public" litigation before the courts and thus to increase the
pressure for fee shifting.
available under other federal civil rights acts. One such remedy was the award of
attorney's fees. Thus, as there is no indication that the change was made for substantive
reasons, the original language should still be followed and fees whould be awarded under
§ 1983 as originally intended by Congress. See Brief for Plaintiff in support of petition
for counsel fees, Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., No. EC70-51S (N.D.
Miss., brief filed Dec. 21, 1973).
14 The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Report, on what was
ultimately to become Title VII of the Emergency School Aid Act through the Education
Amendments of 1972, offers the following explanation:
[School desegregation] laws are not not being enforced throughout the nation.
The Federal government is devoting neither the time, effort nor the financial
resources necessary for adequate law enforcement ....
The Committee believes
that funds should be made available to assure that Federal laws will be enforced
throughout the country, while at the same time, under the policies and programs set forth in this bill, voluntary efforts to achieve quality education in
stable integrated environments are assisted throughout the nation.
Although litigation directed toward the enforcement of these laws is often
time consuming and therefore expensive, litigation on behalf of those injured by
breach of legal requirements remains the most effective and economical method
of which the Committee is aware to obtain protection of legal rights.
S. REP. No. 92-61, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1971).
149 See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (tenant farmers challenging regulation
of Secretary of Agriculture); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (federal taxpayers
challenging expenditure of federal funds); Office of Communications of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (representatives of listening
public challenging license renewal for radio station); Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n,
318 F.2d 187, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963) (transit riders challenging fare
increase); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(residents of affected area challenging urban renewal program). But see Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (environmental group seeking to restrain Interior Dep't
from approving an extensive skiing development in a national park).
Is' See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to
Rules, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-107 (1966). But see Zahn v. International Paper Co., 39 F.R.D. 69,
98-107 (1966). 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973) (holding that each member of the plaintiff class in a
diversity action must meet the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1970) in order for the suit to be maintained as a class action).
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Together, these factors dramatized the economic barriers
impeding the meaningful access of the average citizen to judicial
relief, particularly where the defendant was likely to be either a
large corporation or the state, the issues involved were likely to
be novel and complex, and the relief sought was likely to be
injunctive rather than monetary. Because of the gross disparity
in financial resources between typical plaintiffs and defendants,
federal rights were not likely to be enforced in the private
sphere.' 5 1 Congress responded to this perception by providing
for award of attorney's fees in legislation- creating private rights
of action where such a disparity in legal resources seemed most
likely to exist (e.g., Truth-in-Lending actions), 5 2 giving courts a
basis for development of the private attorney general theory.
2. Evolution of Traditional Equitable Grounds
The historical factors and evidences of congressional sentiment, discussed above, have also prompted liberalization of the
two traditional equitable exceptions to the general American
Rule. 1 53 As part of its general equity powers, 5 4 the federal
judiciary has always been able to award attorney's fees in a
proper case. One major exception allows courts to award counsel
fees to a litigant whose opponent has pursued a clearly unfounded action or defense and has done so "in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons."'1 55 The obvious
the honest litigant and to
purpose of such an award is to protect
56
discourage abuse of the courts.'
The bad faith exception has been expanded most notably in
the recent line of school desegregation cases, beginning with Bell
1-1In 1964, Senator Humphrey stated that the estimated cost of a civil rights suit
which was appealed was $15,000 to $18,000. See 110 CONG. REC. 6541 (1964). In view of
the recent
inflation, these costs must have increased substantially in the past 10 years.
152
See Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970); Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970); Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1617
(Supp. II, 1972); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §
1365(d) (Supp. II, 1972).
153 Although the general American Rule against award of counsel fees as costs is
often cited, arrangements have developed to soften the harsh consequences of this rule
where the litigants are likely to be of unequal economic strength. Contingent fee
arrangements, coupled with awards for pain and suffering in tort cases, for example, are
a means of overcoming the hardship imposed by the American rule. See notes 108-11
supra & accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939) ("Allowance of
such [attorney's] costs in appropriate situations is part of the historic equity jurisdiction of
the federal courts.") (Frankfurter, J.);notes 48-54 supra & accompanying text.
54.77[2], at 1709 (2d ed. 1971) (footnote
155 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
omitted).
156 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) ("In this class of cases, the underlying rationale
for 'fee shifting' is, of course, punitive .... ") (dictum).
For a discussion of the possible use of an expanded version of this rationale to
alleviate some of the problems created by the American Rule, see notes 113-26 supra &
accompanying text.
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v. School Board1 57 in 1963. By reformulating the traditional bad
faith standard, the courts in those cases have moved to close the
economic gap between black plaintiffs and governmental defendants where the plaintiffs seek only to move local schools in the
direction clearly required by public policy. Thus in Cato v.
Parham,15 8 the court awarded fees despite no finding of bad faith
on the part of the school board. Noting that "whatever progress
has been made in the direction of desegregation ... has followed
judicial prodding," 5 9 the court found the need for judicial
intervention to be a sufficient substitute for more traditional bad
faith. The new elements for an award based on "bad faith" thus
seem to be a clearly defined and established right, and the need
for judicial assistance in securing that right. Shifting fees in such
a situation recognizes the unfairness of imposing the costs of
litigation on the party who should have freely enjoyed his
160
rights.
Congress, perhaps reacting to the strictness of even this
standard, has enacted a still more liberal standard in section 718
of the Emergency School Aid Act. 16 1 The section allows an
award of fees when the court finds that the "proceedings were
necessary to bring about compliance."' 162 This seems to be a
simple "but for" test under which fees would usually be awarded
so long as the plaintiffs litigated in good faith. In fact, the
Supreme Court has ruled that fee awards should be the normal
rule under this statute.

63

The second major area where the federal courts exercise
157 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). The appellate court reversed the district cour's
denial of attorney's fees, citing the school board's
long continued pattern of evasion and obstruction which included not only the
defendants' unyielding refusal to take any initiative, thus casting a heavy burden
on the children and their parents, but their interposing a variety of administrative obstacles to thwart the valid wishes of the plaintiff for a desegregated
education.
Id. at 500.
158 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), affd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1968).
1 9
5 Id. at 1378.
160 The bad faith exception is incorporated into various state and federal procedural
rules. For example:
In an action or part of an action, if the court finds that any proceeding was
had (1) in bad faith, (2) without substantial justification, or (3) for purposes of
delay, the court shall require the moving party to pay to the adverse party the
amount of the costs thereof and the reasonable expenses incurred by the
adverse party in opposing such proceeding, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
MD. CT. App. (Civ.) R. 604(b).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make more limited provision for fee awards in
instances of bad-faith litigation. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a), (c).
161 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. II, 1972).
162
1d.
163
See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) ("IT]he successful
plaintiff 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust.' ").
North-ross is likely to lead to a distinct line of school desegregation cases focusing on
the size of the fee award, rather than on the propriety of any award.
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their equitable power to award attorney's fees is that involving a
common fund. The award is made to avoid the unjust enrichment of a class at the expense of the individual litigant, who has
created or protected a fund in which all share. 1 64 The fee is
normally awarded to the individual litigant out of the common
fund. Here, the doctrine has been elaborated into the so-called
"substantial benefit" rule. One commentator has explained the
development:
The traditional common fund over which the court
exercises its jurisdiction always represents a benefit
capable of translation into money. Conceptually, however, the fund is the aggregate benefit produced by the
litigation, and the court taxes any convenient resource
jointly owned by the true beneficiaries. Since the court's
power to award legal fees is totally independent of the
existence of a fund, it is not difficult to understand the
judicial development from the monetary common fund
theory to the nonmonetary substantial benefit variant.
To award fees under the substantial benefit rule, the
court must have jurisdiction over some resource which
litigation but which is common to
is not at issue in the 65
all the beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court endorsed this development in the 1970
case of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,' 66 a shareholders' derivative
action brought under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934167 to dissolve a corporate merger approved by the
shareholders on the basis of a misleading proxy statement. The
Court held that "fair and informed corporate s.uffrage" was a
benefit produced by the suit sufficient to justify the award of fees
out of corporate assets where the court had jurisdiction over the
assets and the benefit extended to all of the shareholders. Benefit
here has nothing to do with the subjective evaluation of the
corporation or a majority of its shareholders. Instead it is
defined in terms of achieving the purposes of the statute under
164
The most frequently cited statement of the traditional common fund rationale is
found in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1882):
[I]f the complainant is not a trustee, he has at least acted the part of a trustee in
It would not only be unjust to him, but it
relation to the common interest ....
would give to the other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund
an unfair advantage. He has worked for them as well as for himself; and if he
cannot be reimbursed out of the fund itself, they ought to contribute their due
proportion of the expenses which he has fairly incurred. To make them a
charge upon the fund is the most equitable way of securing such contribution.
165 Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58
CORNELL L. Rav. 1222, 1234 (1973) (footnote omitted).
166 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
167 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
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which suit is brought for the common benefit. Justice Harlan
used broad language in justifying this new standard:
[T]he stress placed by Congress on the importance of
fair and informed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the
corporation and its shareholders. . . . [P]rivate stockholders' actions of this sort "involve corporate therapeutics," and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by provid-

ing an important
means of enforcement of the proxy
68
statute.1

The Mills Court expressed the benefit rule in terms not
limited to any particular class of litigation. Fees would be allowed
in all cases "where a plaintiff has successfully maintained a suit,
usually on behalf of a class, that benefits a group of others in the
same manner as himself."'1 69 Furthermore, fees may be shifted
"where the litigation has conferred a substantial benefit on the
members of an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award
that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among
17 0
them."
This "substantial benefit" fee award was developed most
clearly in the lower federal courts prior to Mills in cases involving
political rights of union members. Beginning in 1951 with Rolax
v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 171 federal courts have awarded
fees to union members successfully suing their unions to enforce
rights of due process, fair representation and free speech or
fiduciary duties owed to minority members. 7 2 The cases reflect
168 396 U.S. at 396 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The Court's use of the term "corporate therapeutics" is taken from Hornstein, Legal
Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REv. 658 (1956). See
also Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLuM. L. R~v. 784
(1939).
Such reasoning led one commentator to read the decision as establishing a
law-enforcement-as-benefit rationale, legitimatizing the fee award "based solely on law
enforcement policy considerations." Note, supra note 59, at 327. See also Note, Attorneys'
Fees in ShareholderDerivative Suits: The Substantial Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60 CAL. L. REv.
164 (1972); Note, ShareholderSuits: PecuniaryBenefit Unnecessaryfor Counsel Fee Award, 13
STAN. L. REv. 146 (1960); Note, Attorneys' Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit" Sufficient to
Award Fees From Third Party Beneficiaries, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 271.
169
396 U.S. at 392.
0
" Id. at 393-94.
171186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
172See, e.g., Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 354-55 (3d Cir. 1967):
Plainly the federal courts are empowered ... to come to the aid of any union
member whose civil rights have been infringed upon by the union and to
compensate that member for reasonable counsel fees and other expenses resulting from that . . . action.
...
In the context of the Labor Management Act it is untenable to assert
that in establishing the bill of rights under the Act Congress intended to have
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the courts' common perception-of three persuasive factors for
awarding fees: the fiduciary relationship between a labor union
and its members; 173 the disparity in economic resources between
the individual plaintiff and the defendant union; 74 and the
importance of the political rights vindicated to the maintenance
of democratic fairness. 1 7 5 As in Mills, the "benefit" is actually the
vindication of congressional policy.
In Hall v. Cole' 7 6 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the benefit
approach used in Mills. The suit was brought by a union member
claiming that his right to free speech had been infringed by the
union. Justice Brennan's opinion explained the benefit conferred:
[T]here can be no doubt that, by vindicating his own
right of free speech guaranteed by § 101(a)(2) of Title 1
of the LMRDA, respondent necessarily rendered a substantial service to his union as an institution and to all of
its members. When a union member is disciplined for
the exercise of any of the rights protected by Title I, the
rights of all members of the union are threatened. And,
those rights diminished by the unescapable [sic] fact that an aggrieved union
member would be unable to finance litigation and would have no hope of
remuneration even if he could some way or other proceed with his suit.
See also Blankenship v. Boyle, 337 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1972) (breach of fiduciary duty);
Burch v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 78 L.R.R.M. 2444 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (denial of
due process); Local 648, Retail Clerks v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012
(D.D.C. 1969) (insurgent candidates dismissed for political opposition); Sands v. Abelli,
290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (plaintiff blacklisted and removed from office by local
union).
173Congress in section 501(a) [of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1970)] has defined the fiduciary status of union
officers. They are to execute their trust for the benefit of the organization and
its members. Should such officers violate their trust, a member of the union is
authorized under section 501(b) to initiate steps looking toward remedial action.
Thus, any such member and his counsel are to be protected, all to the end that
the membership itself may police its own labor organization, whether the suit
seeks damages or an accounting "or other appropriate relief for the benefit of
the labor organization."
Bakery Workers Int'l Union v. Ratner, 335 F.2d 691, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
174 It is difficult for individual members of labor unions to stand up and fight
those who are in charge. The latter have the treasury of the union at their
command and the paid union counsel at their beck and call while the member is
on his own. . . . An individual union member could not carry such a heavy
financial burden. Without counsel fees the grant of federal jurisdiction is but a
gesture for few union members could avail themselves of it.
Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972), quoted with approval in Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 13 (1973).
175 Congress recognized that it was imperative that all union members be guaranteed
at least "minimum standards of democratic process and conduct for the administration of
internal union affairs." 105 CONG. REc. 6471 (1959) (Remarks of Sen. McClellan
concerning Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
411-15 (1970)). Plaintiff's right of free speech and assembly and other "political" rights
are guaranteed by Title I of the LMRDA and were deemed "vital to the independence of
the membership and the effective and fair operation of the union as the representative of
its membership." Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 780 (2d Cir. 1972), quoted in Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
176412 U.S. 1 (1973).
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by vindicating his own right, the successful litigant dispels the "chill" cast upon the rights of others .... Thus,

as in Mills, reimbursement of respondent's attorneys'
fees out of the union treasury simply shifts the costs of
litigation to 'the class that has benefitted from them and
that would
have had to pay for them had it brought the
77
suit."'

Additionally, fee shifting was thought to be a means of
giving vitality to the protection of statutory rights .

7

The reasoning of Mills and Hall has also been used to allow
fee awards in cases involving free speech within colleges 17 9 and
the denial of membership in a stock exchange.' 8 0 The extension
of the substantial benefit theory to cases involving nonmonetary
political rights may be reducing the basis of that theory to the
simple encouragement of private law enforcement, at least where
political processes and democratic fairness are in issue. Perhaps
the courts are actually reshaping their traditional fee shifting
powers to lower the economic barriers to access to the judicial
system by the citizen-unionmember-shareholder, and to help
balance, at least in the area of political rights and due process,
the representation of these important interests.
It is not surprising that the courts would want to accomplish
such an objective. The factors discussed above' 8 ' which have
brought previously unrepresented interests before the courts
have also introduced an unprecedented number of public policy
issues into the courts.' 8 2 Confronted with demands that they play
a more active role in determing issues with wide public impact,
the courts perhaps perceived that a balanced representation of
affected interests would be essential to sound decision, and that
balanced representation was in many areas of public policy
severely distorted by the disparity in financial and legal resources
8 3
available to different sectors of the public in such litigation.1
Seen in this perspective, the change was necessary to preserve
77

Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted).
7"Id. at 13.
'79See Rainey v. Jackson State College, 481 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973); Stolberg v.
Members of the Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
8
" See Bright v. Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
181See notes 145-150 supra & accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., Ojeda v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1972) (court required to
determine the rights of welfare recipients); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (court called upon to consider the proper level of treatment for mentally ill
1

patients).
183 Having represented both corporations and public interest groups, I believe it
is fair to conclude that as things now stand, the more complex the public issue,
the more likely it is that the decision-maker-be it an administrative agency or a
court-will be presented with an increasingly one-sided approach to the problem.
Hearings, supra note 127, at 841 (Testimony of D. Flannery, Esq.).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:636

the fairness of policy making by the third branch of government,
and was parallel and complementary to the development of the
private attorney general theory.
C. Development of the Private Attorney General Theory
Given this background, the adoption of a new and more
comprehensive theory for award of counsel fees by the Supreme
Court is hardly surprising. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc.184 was perhaps the strongest case possible for acceptance of
the private attorney general theory. There was express statutory
provision for fee shifting, the action was for injunctive relief, the
protection of civil rights was an especially appropriate function
for the Court, the litigation would benefit a broader segment of
the public than those bringing the suit, and there was no means
within the Court's jurisdiction of distributing the cost of the
litigation among the benefited class in accordance with the substantial benefit approach.
Although a strict interpretation of Piggie Park would limit
the holding to require these factors, the lower federal courts
have lost little time in using variations on the basic approach to
justify fee shifting in a rapidly expanding line of private attorney
general cases. Throughout, the common factor has been the
necessity of fee shifting to permit meaningful private enforcement of o--, cected rights. 85 An early case which applied the
private attorney general theory to litigation in the absence of
express statutory authority was Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.'8
The court there looked to the statutory provision for fee shifting
in the Fair Housing Law 187 as evidence of congressional policy in
closely related legislation. Finding that "[t]he statute ...depends
entirely on private enforcement,"' 8 8 the
court applied the Piggie
189
Park reasoning to the suit before it.
This holding was soon followed by other decisions which
184390 U.S. 400 (1968); see text accompanying note 132 supra.

185 A characteristic of many of the cases in each of these lines of authority [cases

following substantial benefit or private attorney theory] is that the plaintiff
represented a minority group or interest and only by resort to the courts could
the plaintiff ensure that the defendants fulfilled their fiduciary or other obligations to persons in the plaintiffs situation. Particularly where the defendant is a
governmental entity, such litigation may be regarded as a means of offsetting
the possibly limited opportunities for minority interests to assure through the
political process that their governing bodies fulfill their duties to them, as part of
their obligations to the general community. The availability of an attorney fee
award in such a case would presumably have the desirable effect of minimizing
some barriers to this exercise of constitutional rights.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.6, Bradley v. School Bd., 412 U.S. 937
(1973), granting cert. to 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).
186
444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
87
See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
188 444 F.2d at 147.

189Suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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extended the private attorney general theory to cases arising
under related statutes. 19 Many of these decisions extending the
application of the private attorney general theory also found bad
faith on the part of the defendant, 1 91 so the new theory was
applied in cases where the award was justified on more traditional grounds. However, numerous other.awards have since
been made
under the same sections without any finding of bad
faith.192
The private attorney general theory has only recently been
applied to areas other than civil rights where no statutory authorization for fee shifting exists. Sims v. Amos' 93 is a leading
decision applying the new approach to reapportionment litigation. There the court awarded fees for the following reasons:
In instituting the case subjudice, plaintiffs have served in
the capacity of "private attorneys general" seeking to
enforce the rights of the class they represent. . . . If,
pursuant to this action, plaintiffs have benefited their
class and have effectuated a strong congressional policy,
they are entitled to attorneys' fees regardless of defendants' good or bad faith. . . . Indeed, under such
circumstances, the award loses much of its discretionary
character and becomes a part of the effective remedy a
court should fashion to encourage public-minded
suits,
94
. . . and to carry out congressional policy.'
The two elements identified in this decision-benefit to the
public and effectuation of a strong congressional policy-suggest
an overlap with the substantial benefit approach. Indeed, in
many reapportionment decisions awarding fees, it is difficult to
discern which approach is the basis for the award. 95 The distinction between the two approaches has been obscured by the more
liberal extensions of the substantial benefit theory.' 96 In concept,
190 See Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (§ 1981); NAACP v. Allen, 340
F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (§ 1983); Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971)
(same).
191 See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971);
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691
(M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
192See, e.g., Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (§ 1983); Brown v.
Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (§ 1982).

For an excellent collection of reported and unreported decisions involving awards of
attorney's fees, see M. Derfner, Attorneys' Fees in Pro Bono Publico Cases (Aug. 1972)
(available from the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, Washington, D.C.).
193
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
94
1
Id. at 694 (citations omitted).
195 See, e.g., Clark v. DeSoto Parish Police Jury, Civil No. 17,266 (W.D. La. 1972)
(reapportionment).
190While Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), expanded the benefit
theory to include nonmonetary benefits, it did not define what now are the limits of the
term "benefit." If benefit can be defined as simply a result of law enforcement, then the
benefit and the private attorney general theories become indistinguishable so long as the
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the benefit theory is defensive, preventing unjust enrichment by
taxing the true beneficiaries of the litigation, while the private
attorney general theory is offensive, promoting the effective
197
implementation of public policy by taxing the defendant.
Since the defendant often, as in reapportionment and much
corporate and labor litigation, is also the representative of the
beneficiaries, the two approaches coalesce in result. So long as
the court has within its jurisdiction the means of distributing the
costs of the litigation, the benefit theory is adequate. The private
attorney general theory becomes necessary only when the court
cannot feasibly match the costs with the benefits which are
created or protected by judicial action.
The two most recent leading cases extending the private
attorney general theory of court awarded attorney's fees were
authored by Judge Peckham of the Northern District of California. La Raza Unida v. Volpe' 9 8 is the first application of this theory
to environmental litigation, 199 representing a significant extension of the approach. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher,200 decided less
than a year later, awarded fees to a party (not suspected of a
crime) who brought an action for injunctive relief under section
1983201 after being subjected to a search which violated the
fourth amendment. Of course the award of fees under section
1983 is not new, but the opinion tries to establish new criteria for
such an award which are worth examining in detail and in
comparison to the standards used in La Raza.
The cases share some important characteristics. Both suits
were for injunctive relief; the relevant statutes were silent as to
fee awards and lacked "a 'meticulously detailed' pattern of
remedies";2 0 2 the defendants in each were, in effect, governmencourt has control over a solvent party, such as a corporation, labor union or governmental body, roughly representing the class that can be said to have been benefited. See
generally Note, Attorneys' Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit" Sufficient to Award Fees From Third
Party197
Beneficiaries, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 271.
See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
198Id.

For recent comment on the impact and importance of the La Raza opinion, see
Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301 (1973); Note,
Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REv.
1222 (1973); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "PrivateAttorney General":Judicial Green
Light to PrivateLitigation in the PublicInterest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Green Light]. The relationship of attorney's fees to public interest litigation is discussed in
testimony given in hearings held by Senator Tunney before the Subcommittee on
Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Oct. 4 &
5, 1973. See Hearings, supra note 127, at 787-88 (Opening Remarks of Sen. Tunney on
Court Award of Attorney's Fees).
199 Although the case can be read as a housing decision with as much justification, it
seems that it will more often be cited for its breakthrough in the environmental area, if
only because that is currently a more litigated area of the law.
200 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
20142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
...The award of attorney's fees has been held inappropriate where the governing
statute provides for detailed and complete remedies without authorizing award of
counsel fees. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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tal units; and the plaintiffs in each case would have been unable
to finance such litigation were it not for exceptional legal assistance from unpaid attorneys. In other words, plaintiffs in both
cases would normally have been unable to seek judicial protection absent the possibility of fee shifting.
The La Raza opinion identified three factors which governed the decision to award fees under the private attorney
general theory: "the strength of the Congressional policy, the
number of people benefited by the litigants' efforts, and the
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement." 20 3 Stanford Daily, on the other hand, gave four criteria:
Where as here fee shifting is necessary to insure the
vindication of important constitutional rights and appropriate because of the inadequate remedies otherwise
available, because it is consistent with a remedy increasingly furnished by Congress, and because of the high
social value placed upon the rights involved, an award
of attorney's fees as costs is essential, lest these important rights be relegated to a mere platitude.20 4
The opinion does not explain the difference between "important constitutional rights" and "high social value placed on
the rights involved." These seem to be essentially the same as the
"strength of Congressional policy" criterion in La Raza, and it
appears they all derive from decisions such as Mills and Hall v.
Cole which stressed the societal importance of the rights vindicated.
The other common factor is the necessity of private enforcement, which comprehends both the inadequacy of public
enforcement2 0 5 and the need for fee shifting to make private
enforcement possible.20 6 The concern here is that without an
award of fees, the rights protected by the law will not be capable
of adequate implementation or vindication.
The La Raza criterion with regard to the number of people
benefited seems to be aimed at limiting the scope of the exception by distinguishing public from private litigation. Although
the court could have pointed to the deterrent effect of litigation
203 57 F.R.D. at 99.

Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (footnote omitted).
"The only public entities that might have brought suit in this case were named as
defendants in this action and vigorously opposed plaintiffs' contentions. Only a private
party could have been expected to bring this litigation.
... 57 F.R.D. at 101.
206 In many 'public interest' cases only injunctive relief is sought, and the
average attorney or litigant must hesitate, if not shudder, at the thought of
'taking on' an entity such as the California Department of Highways, with no
prospect of financial compensation for the efforts and expenses rendered. The
expense of litigation in such a case poses a formidable, if not insurmountable,
114
205

obstacle.
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which protects the rights of all citizens, this factor is absent from
the Stanford Daily opinion wherein only a few people were
affected directly.
Finally, the Stanford Daily criterion, "consisten[cy] with a
remedy increasingly furnished by Congress," seems merely to
recognize the parallel remedies developing in Congress and in
the courts. 207 No such factor is mentioned in La Raza, although
the court there could have cited amendments to environmental
legislation enacted contemporaneously with the decision. 208 The
two decisions, read together, thus summarize the major relevant
factors considered by the courts in the decision to award fees
under the private attorney general theory.20 9
D. Analysis of the Theory
1. When Is Its Application Appropriate?
Several conceptual difficulties with the four factors
identified in La Raza and Stanford Daily emerge on close analysis.
After discussing the problems associated with each, this section
will propose a new set of criteria for fee awards. In this discussion two underlying goals are assumed: the fair allocation of the
inevitable costs of litigation, and the strengthening of 2legal
10
protections through increased access to judicial remedies.
The obvious difficulty with the "strength of public policy"
factor common to. the decisions is that it requires a subjective
evaluation on the part of a judge. In effect, it asks him to
distinguish important rights from less important ones and
thereby invites usurpation of the legislative function. As the
Fourth Circuit opinion in Bradley v. School Board2 11 noted:
[I]t will launch courts upon the difficult and complex
task of determining what is public policy, an issue normally reserved for legislative determination, and, even
more difficult, which public policy warrants the encouragement of award of fees to attorneys for private litigants who voluntarily take upon themselves the character of private attorneys-general.2 12
207 E.g., the statutory provisions for award of attorney's fees discussed in notes 147,
152 sua.
2o See, e.g., note 152 supra.
209 Although Stanford Daily does not explicitly state that the fee award is based on the
private attorney general theory, the elements in the court's analysis as well as the
dependence on La Raza make it apparent that this was the ground of the decision.
210 Increased access does not necessarily imply more litigation with the resultant
problems of clogged court calenders and long delays. Access is important as a bargaining
chip in settlement negotiations, and equal ability to threaten trial tends to equalize the
bargaining relationship.
211 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 937 (1973).
12
1
Id. at 329 (footnote omitted).

1974]

ATTORNEY'S FEES

It is by no means clear why the courts are the appropriate locus
for such decisions. It is appropriate for the courts to use their
equitable powers where necessary to make statutory protections
effective, 2 13 because the rights have been enacted by the legislature. But to establish a criterion that seeks to promote such
enacted rights but not others seems a legislative function. The
difficulty is thus not only that no reasonably objective standards
can be formulated to differentiate statutes on the basis of the
relative strength of their respective policy goals, but more fundamentally that such differentiation is not the proper function of
the judiciary. Where rights are created by the legislature the
courts may imply the existence of remedies necessary to their
effective protection.2 14 They stand on less sure footing when
they themselves attempt to arrange the priorities for public
policy enforcement.
"Necessity of private enforcement," the second major factor
discussed above, looks to the adequacy of public enforcement
and seeks economic equalization of representation in cases where
private enforcement is necessary. Where suit is brought against
governmental agencies and officials, the necessity of private
enforcement is obvious. In such situations private citizens alone
and the disparity in legal resources
must "guard the guardians"
2 15
is likely to be greatest.
On the other hand, where the action is brought against a
private defendant, public enforcement may be adequate. Assuming no bad faith, why should a losing private defendant have to
pay more when suit is brought by a private plaintiff than when a
public official seeks enforcement? If public enforcement is inadequate due to lack of staff or of funding, then it may well be
appropriate for the court to authorize awards to private litigants
who are in essence doing the job of public enforcement for the
government. Since public enforcement is normally supported
from general tax revenues, however, why should the losing
defendant be taxed exclusively? Fairness would seem to require
that the private attorney general be awarded fees from the same
'2'3 Thus, in suits for damages based on violations of federal statutes lacking any
express authorization of a damage remedy, this Court has authorized such relief
where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy
underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineermen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)14
While various rationales have been given for
including attorney's fees as
costs, the courts are in essence making a judgment that including attorney's fees
as costs is an additional remedy necessary to effectuate the congressional
underpinnings of a substantial program.
Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 23.
Stanford
21
5See note 206 supra.
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source as the public law enforcement budget, i.e., the public
treasury.21 6 Taxing the defendant instead of the public treasury
does act as a deterrent by raising the cost of an unsucessful
defense in court, but it is not at all clear that this is fair or
desirable from a public policy point of view. If the effect is
primarily to deter litigation (or encourage nuisance suits) instead
of to deter the undesirable conduct, public policy is poorly
served by taking the case out of the judicial system. Thus, the
deterrence argument alone should not prevent the award of fees
from public funds.
As to the .issue of disparity in legal resources, one underlying policy motivation is the courts' need to have balanced representation for the parties so that an informed decision may be
reached. 21

7

More importantly, in decisions concerning major

issues of public policy, where it is crucial for the court to
consider all sides before making a decision, fee awards for those
parties that would not otherwise be able to afford representation
serve the interests of the court.21" The difficulty here is that if
awards are to be made as part of public policy making, what
standards are to govern the determination of which interests are
eligible for such awards and which are not? If, on the other
hand, fee awards are made only to those "whowould otherwise be
unable to protect their rights adequately in court, does considerthe taxed
ation of the economic position of the plaintiff deprive
21 9
defendant of the equal protection of the laws?
The third criterion, "number of people benefited," is an
attempt to distinguish public suits from private ones. But as
Stanford Daily and other suits indicate, courts have awarded fees
where only a single individual or a small group was directly
benefited. Using terms like "deterrence" or "therapeutics" to
show an indirect benefit to more people simply confuses the
conceptual differences between the private attorney general
theory and the substantial benefit theory. 2 20 The private attorney
general theory speaks, in essence, to the effective implementa216 See Mause, supra note 6.
217This is particularly true where the factual and legal issues are complex or
technical. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (environmental); Hargrove v. Caddo Parish School Bd., Civil No. 17,630 (W.D. La. 1972) (reapportionment);
Martinolich v. Dean, Civil No. 3111 (S.D. Miss. 1972) (reapportionment).
21 8
See note 183 supra.
219 Why should the private defendant bear a greater potential liability toward a
poorer or less well organized plaintiff than toward one who is able to finance litigation on
his own? This seems to create something of a double standard, particularly where the
attorney's fee award exceeds the other monetary relief. Cf Advance Business Systems &
Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968), affJd & remanded or
modification on other grounds, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970)
($35,875 fee award in antitrust action in which actual damages were $16,714). The
private defendant is not in the same position in this regard as is the government, for it is
unique obligation to provide for equality of law enforcement.
the government's
22
0 See note 197 supra & accompanying text.
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don of public policy, regardless of the number of people
benefited. The substantial benefit theory of Mills, on the other
hand, is addressed to the fair matching of the costs and benefits
of the litigation, regardless of public policy concerning the rights
created or protected. "Deterrence" or "therapeutics" language
seems to be a signal that the benefit theory is being transformed
into a means of encouraging policy enforcement. While awards
for such enforcement may be appropriate, particularly where
political processes are involved, 2 2 1 the theory used should be
correctly identified as that of the private attorney general.
Otherwise the courts and legislatures that use the theories will be
more vulnerable to criticism and doubts, and awards will be
made less often than they should be because of the usual conservative response to confusion. 222 In addition, as recognized by
Judge Peckham in La Raza, 22 3 many public interest suits do not
benefit all of the public evenly. Suits against governmental bodies
rarely fit the benefit model on any but the most generalized
basis.
Thus, especially in suits against public entities, the size of the
class benefited is not a determinative factor in deciding whether
to award fees under the private attorney general theory. The
problem of identifying suits involving the public interest remains, however, and it will be discussed in the following section.
The fourth factor mentioned by Judge Peckham, "consisten[cy] with a remedy furnished by Congress," seems unneeded in light of the courts' traditional equitable powers to
fashion effective remedies. But to the extent that legislative
provisions for the award of fees exist in closely related statutes,
the policy behind a fee award is given increased weight and the
complaint about judicial usurpation of legislative decisions expressed above 22 4 is partially answered. Perhaps this criterion
could be more meaningfully understood to imply that where
there is parallel legislative authority, fee awards will be made as a
matter of course unless special circumstances would make the
175 supra & accompanying text.
Cf. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 937
(1973); notes 239-45 infra & accompanying text.
223 Mills extended the scope of the common-fund justification for the awarding
of fees by holding that no pecuniary benefit need be demonstrated... In so doing it
has become exceedingly difficult to trace the benefits of litigation to their
ultimate beneficiaries, so as to apportion the attorneys' fees amongst them.
Because of the attendant difficulties in determining the ultimate beneficiaries,
the "common fund" mold simply does not fit the present situation. As Judge
Merhige stated in Bradley v. School Board . . . , wherein he rejected the
common fund theory as a basis for awarding attorneys' fees in a school
desegregation case: 'School desegregation cases, or any suits against governmental bodies, do not fit this fund model without considerable cutting and trim22t See note
22 2

ming.'
57 F.R.D. at 97 (citations and footnotes omitted).
224 See notes 211-14 supra & accompanying text.
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award unjust. Thus the legislative authorization of discretionary
burden of
fee shifting can be understood as transferring the
22 5
proving special circumstances to the losing party.
2. Proposed Criteria for Fee Shifting
If the private attorney general theory is best understood as a
means of encouraging public policy enforcement through the
courts, then clearly the most fundamental problem faced by
those who would use it is to limit its application to litigation
brought in the public interest. Given the present American Rule,
courts will be unwilling to adopt a rationale that could lead to a
universal fee award system.22 6 The task, then, is to formulate
workable criteria for determining what litigation serves the public interest in a way appropriate for the award of counsel fees.
The term "public interest," although frequently used here
and elsewhere, raises serious conceptual difficulties. 2 In a
pluralistic society such as ours, it is difficult to maintain that
there is a single public interest or that any particular policy is a
priori in the public interest. Substantive approaches to
a
22 8
definition easily reduce to differences in subjective values.
A procedural approach, however, emphasizing fairness and
the importance of representation for every interest in the policy
making process, may be more fruitful. This approach is an
integral part of American idealism. 2 2 9 As one writer observed:
"The method for obtaining a full or equalized presentation of
competing sides in a conflict, whether they be people or ideas, is
the central problem for our legal institutions. It is the central
225 Since the courts have always had the power to award fees in exceptional circumstances, statutory fee shifting provisions might be redundant on any other interpretation.
See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
"' See Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 937
(1973) (court strictly limited the private attorney general theory because, inter alia, of
fears2 of
7 the growth of the theory).
See generally THE PUBLIC INTEREST (C. Friedrich ed. 1962) (NOMOS V); G.
SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1961); Riley, The Challenge of the New Lawyers: Public
Interest and Private Clients, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 547 (1970); Symposium-The Practiceof
Law in the Public Interest, 13 ARIM. L. REv. 797 (1971); Comment, Public Participationin
FederalAdministrativeProceedings, 120 U. PA. L. RFv. 702, 731 (1972); Note, The New Public
Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1070 n.3 (1970).
228 [Clritical investigation has failed to reveal a statement of public interest
theory that offers much promise as a guide either to public officials who are
supposed to make decisions in the public interest or to research scholars who
might. wish to investigate the extent to which governmental decisions are
empirically made in the public interest.
Schubert, Is There a Public Interest?, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST 172 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962)
(NOMOS V).
129 In a different context, Judge Learned Hand remarked: "[R]ight conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many, this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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focus of a 'public interest response.' "2130 Thus public interest
representation can be defined as "representation of an otherwise
inadequately represented policy position . . . formulated to
promote an interest which will be affected by the decision to be
made."'2 3 ' This approach is based on ethical relativism which
requires that all relevant interests and perspectives be heard
before a decision is made. Under this definition, attorney's fees
should be granted any party who seeks to represent a relevant
policy position which is not normally represented before the
court.
This conception of public interest litigation would result in a
radical revision of the private attorney general theory as it now
exists. It would, in essence, lead to fee awards regardless of
whether the party is successful on the merits, regardless of any
benefit that might result apart from full and fair representation.
However, due to the sweeping scope of such a change, other
criteria may be needed to prevent complete dislocation of our
judicial system. The fear of frivolous litigation is often given as a
justification for limiting awards to successful litigants23 2 and is
probably a valid argument here except when a court finds that
2 33
an unsuccessful suit has served to further public policy goals
3
4
or educate the court.
Although a successful defense against
public prosecution may occasionally serve to "police the prosecution" and may also serve to represent a normally underrepresented interest before the court,23 5 no readily apparent policy of
23A0F. MARKS,

(1972).

THE LAWYER,

THE PUBLIC,

AND

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

51

231 Comment, Public Participationin FederalAdministrative Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L.
REv. 702, 731 (1972) (emphasis in original).
The Comment notes further that there are two qualifications to this definition: the
function of public interest representation may be served by others than those usually
identified as "public interest groups"; and the concept of an "interest" is defined by the
decisionmaker (the court) in each individual case.
232 Typical of the expressed Congressional intent with respect to the award of
attorney's fees under § 2000a-3(b) [allowing award of attorney's fees in actions
brought under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to only the prevailing
party] is the following remark by Senator Lausche during debate prior to
passage:
"That language was inserted in the bill to deter the bringing of lawsuits
without foundation." 110 Cong. Rec. at 13189-90.
Senator Pastore agreed:
"The purpose of this provision * * * is to discourage frivolous suits
* * *." 110-Cong. Rec. at 13720-21.
United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871, 872 (D.R.I. 1970) (footnote omitted).
233 See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 847 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (court will
consider fee award to unsuccessful plaintiffs in environmental action because legal action
spurred improvements in environmental aspects of design for real estate development).
234 See Hargrove v. Caddo Parish School Bd., Civil No. 17,630 (W.D. La. 1972) (court
awarded fees to unsuccessful plaintiffs-intervenors, citing their service in educating the
court in the problems of reapportionment).
235 See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (criminal
defendants awarded attorney's fees where prosecution was for purpose of intimidation of
prospective voters).
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enforcement is consistently furthered by an award of fees to a
successful defendant. 236 Thus fee awards could generally be
limited to successful plaintiffs even under the proposed system.
The strength of a procedural approach to "public interest"
fee awards is that it focuses on the problem of access to the
courts for those interests which have not previously enjoyed it.
This includes not orly the interests of the poor, but, more
fundamentally, the interests of the unorganized and dispersed
elements of society, which are uneconomical to pursue on a
traditional basis. 2 37 By awarding attorney's fees to representatives of such groups, the courts would be continuing their special
repconcern for the rights of those who are not adequately
238
resented in the other branches of government.
A comparison of the district court's opinion in Bradley v.
School Board23 9 with the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in that
case 240 will illustrate the conflict between the procedural and
substantive approaches. The district court awarded attorney's
fees on two grounds: a liberalized bad faith theory,2 4 ' and in the
alternative the private attorney general theory. 242 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reversed, rejecting, inter alia, the private attorney_
general theory as applied to the case. The essenice of the circuit
court's rejection of that theory was the recognition that without
statutory provision or indication of legislative intent, judges
would be exceeding their proper
role in attempting to determine
24 3
policy:
public
in
priorities
Should the courts, in those instances where Congress
has failed to grant the right [to shift counsel fees],
23

6
But see United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871 (D.R.I. 1970) (award of fees to
defendant motel owner under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for successfully
defending meritless action); Gaster v. Coldiron, 297 A.2d 384 (Del. 1972) (statutory
authorization of fees to plaintiffs and not defendants in mechanic's lien cases violated
equal2 7protection under the 14th amendment).
1 See note 129 supra.
238 Professor Bickel characterizes this widely-shared perception as the Supreme
Court's function "of guarding the elemental integrity of a system in which all groups have
A. BICKEL, THE
access to political power (through exercise of the franchise) .......
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 86 (1970).
239 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412
U.S. 937 (1973).
240 Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 937
(1973). For a more complete criticism of the appellate opinion, see Green Light, supra note
198, at 761-69.

241 53 F.R.D. at 39.
242

Id. at 42.
243 The decision held that a court may grant an attorney's fee in a suit to promote the
public policy expressed in legislative action only if Congress has expressly permitted it.
472 F.2d at 330-31. But in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
attorney's fees could be awarded unless the relevant statutes meticulously detail the
remedies available to the plaintiff and fail to provide for attorney's fees. Id. at 9-14.
Hopefully, this discrepancy will be eliminated when the Supreme Court reviews the
Bradley decision.
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review the legislative omission and sustain or correct the
omission as the court's judgment on public policy suggests? This, it seems to us, would be an unwarranted
exercise of judicial power.2 4 4
This reasoning recalls the difficulties with the "strength of public
policy" criterion discussed earlier, and recognizes the inappropriateness in democratic theory of judges making subjective
judgments as to the relative stength of policies underlying statutory rights.
The district court articulated another more valid understanding of the theory that the appellate judges did not apparently perceive, namely the procedural approach that has been
advocated here. "[J]ustice demands that plaintiff's attorneys be
equipped to inform the court of the consequences of available
choices; this can only be done if the availability of funds for
representation is not left to chance. 2 4 5 The concern of this
language is not with weighing substantive policies, but with
providing adequate legal representation so that the court will
have a sound basis upon which to determine what the relevant
public policy is. The conflict between the district court's opinion
and that of the circuit court is thus, at least with respect to the
proper approach to the private attorney general theory, a
conflict between substantive and procedural understandings of
the public interest.
This discussion has assumed that meaningful legal representation is an important form of political power, one that should be
equally available to all. In such a context, the award of fees to a
private attorney general is simply one way of allocating the costs
of law enforcement and policymaking. From this perspective the
"necessity of private enforcement" factor discussed above,2 4 6 as it
concerns the adequacy of public enforcement, may be justified
on the grounds of reducing redundancy between public and
private attorneys general. To avoid unduly inhibiting protected
rights, however, the courts should look to the adequacy of actual
enforcement by the government and not simply to the adequacy
of potential or authorized public enforcement.2 47 Where the suit
244 472 F.2d at 330.
245 53 F.R.D. at 42.
246

See notes 215-16 supra & accompanying text.
Cf., e.g., Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 950 n.22 (4th Cir. 1972) (declining
to apply the private attorney general theory because both the Department of Justice and
HEW Fvere empowered to enforce the statute); Office of Communication v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("The theory that the Commission can always
effectively represent the listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and
participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfillng the role of private attorneys
general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they are
reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a
valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual experience, neither we nor
the Commission can continue to rely upon it.").
247
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is against a public defendant, normally this criterion will automatically be met.
Where the suit is against a private defendant, and is necessary due to the inadequacy of public law enforcement, then
clearly the private plaintiff is doing the job that public tax funds
are supposed to finance. In such cases, it seems only just that the
court be able to award counsel fees from the state or federal
public treasury 48 depending upon which governmental entity
failed in its law enforcement duty.
Of course this power does not presently exist. But statutory
creation of such a power, coupled with a realistic appropriation,
would serve several beneficial purposes. It would encourage
broader participation by lawyers in public interest litigation. It
would allow awards even to losing litigants when, in the judgment of the court, the litigation served to improve or implement
public policy. Most importantly, the public at large would benefit
from the more evenly balanced adversary representation before
the courts (and perhaps also before administrative agencies), for
policy decisions and conflict resolution affecting the public interest would likely become more informed and thus more
enlightened.
Such an award would also serve to balance the one-sided
subsidy now created by federal tax policy. Present federal income tax law allows business corporations (the most likely private
defendants in public interest litigation) to deduct the cost of
business related litigation, including attorney's fees, from taxable
income.2 4 9 Thus, in terms of public tax expenditures, the federal
treasury already indirectly contributes almost fifty percent 2 50 of
one side's expenses in public interest litigation, regardless of the
merit or reasonableness of such expenses.2 51 Awarding fees to
248 Much of the resistance to the private attorney general theory may be based upon

the fear of unfairness in taxing private defendants for attorney's fees. See note 78 supra &
accompanying text.
249Cf Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (securities dealer allowed to
deduct legal fees-incurred in unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution for securities fraud-as a business expense under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)).
It must be noted, however, that private contributions to public interest law firms are
also deductible in limited circumstances. See REv. PROC. 71-39, 1971-2 CUM. BULL.
575-76. The value of this deduction to the individual donor (and thus of the
government's share of his contribution to the public interest law firm) would, of course,
vary according to his marginal tax rate. See generally Goldsmith, The IRS Man Cometh:
Public Interest Law Firms Meet the Tax Collector, 13 ARIz. L. REv. 857 (1971).
2"0 The current corporate income tax rate is about 48%. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

§ 11.

251 [P]ublic tax dollars are in a very real sense being used to support that

[corporate] litigation. The corporation's litigation expenses, its attorney's fees, its
court costs and all costs connected with the litigation are deductible from the
corporation's income tax. And that is win or lose, frivolous or non-frivolous,
meritorious or nonmeritorious.
Hearings, supra note 127, at 835 (Testimony of D. Flannery, Esq.).
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public interest litigants from public funds would at least serve to
balance the scales in this area.
An even more serious problem in implementing an effective
private attorney general theory arises when the litigation is
against a state government or the federal government.2 52 Even if
the suit is not barred by sovereign immunity, 253 attorney's fees
are explicitly excluded from the costs that the United States is
authorized to pay in cases where no specific statutory provision
controls. 5 4 This prohibition runs directly contrary to the policy
considerations behind the private attorney general fee award. It
acts to inhibit the legal accountability of federal agencies to those
whom they represent. It obstructs the proper matching of expenses with benefits, and it serves to perpetuate the enormous
disparity in legal resources between governmental agencies and
the public interest litigant, often to the detriment of a fair
adversary hearing on the merits.
If the private attorney general theory is to become fully
viable, this statutory provision must be eliminated. 5 5 There is no
252 Federal agencies are named as defendants in a suprisingly large number of
[public interest] cases .... This is particularly true in environmental cases and
in suits by low-income persons challenging the denial of rights conferred by
statute, such as the rights to welfare benefits, relocation housing, etc. In these
cases the difficulties normally present in public interest cases are exacerbated by
the enormous legal resources of a defendant federal agency. where such a
federal agency has been found by the courts to have violated important legislative policies or constitutional mandates, no reason appears why it should not be
liable for the fees incurred by the plaintiffs who bore the burden of vindicating
the rights of the affected public.
Id. 804 (Testimony of J. Kline, Esq., of Public Advocates, Inc.).
253 Although a full discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the I 1th
amendment is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is relevant to the question of fee
awards when a governmental entity is a defendant. In the past courts have refused to
assess fees against a state because of the 11 th amendment and its application to state
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Sincock v. Obara, 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970). But a
recent decision in the 5th Circuit, Gates v. Collier, No. 73-1790 (5th Cir., Dec. 5, 1973),
held that such doctrines did not bar an award of attorney's fees against the State of
Mississippi. The court based its result in large part upon the Supreme Court's affirmance
without opinion of an award of attorney's fees against various officials of the State of
Alabama. See Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
Thus, there seems to be an open question concerning the applicability of these doctrines
to attorney's fees awarded against the states and their officers. For more extensive
consideration of this problem, see Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and
Parties Defendant, 68 MicH. L. REv. 387 (1970); Note, Environmental Litigation Fees, 58
CORNELL L. Ruv. 1222, 1246 t1973). See also note 327 infra.
254 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as
enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of
attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or official of the United States acting in
his official capacity ....
(Emphasis added.)
255 Without this provision federal sovereign immunity would probably still bar
awards against the federal government absent an affirmative indication that such immunity is waived. Cf. West Central Mo. Rural Dev. Corp. v. Phillips, 42 U.S.L.W. 2366
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justification for retaining it in the light of the policy considerations just discussed. Combined with federal and state legislative
provisions for a fund out of which courts would be authorized to
award fees, this would eliminate the major legislative roadblocks
to a more vital and effective role for private attorneys general.
All that would be needed is the courts' continued response to the
equities of the litigation before them.
E.

Conclusion

The recent rapid development of the private attorney general theory of court awarded attorney's fees offers both a promise and a threat. The promise is one of greater access to the
courts for those aspiring to vindicate the public interest. The
threat is that conceptual confusion will prevent further development of this promise.
This Section has considered two approaches to the private
attorney general fee award, corresponding to two understandings of the "public interest" in public interest litigation. The
substantive approach to the definition of public interest seems
most appropriate for a legislative, majoritarian determination.
Thus courts, as the Fourth Circuit recognized in Bradley, should
be wary of awarding fees to representatives of certain substantive
interests and not to others.
Legislative provision for fee awards
2 56
should be the guide.
A procedural approach, on the other hand, is more appropriate for the courts, as it is more neutral. Defining the public
(D.D.C., Dec. 21, 1973). The creation of a fund out of which the courts are authorized to
award fees could be such a waiver.
There is some indication that the courts do not consider themselves completely
without authority to award fees in suits against the federal government when there is no
specific statutory provision for the award. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 360
F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), the court awarded fees against the government even though
there was no specific statutory authorization for the award, stressing the unique character
of the suit. The suit was brought to enforce a fiduciary duty owed to the Tribe by the
Secretary of the Interior, and the court cited two federal statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 175, 476
(1970), that authorize the United States Attorney to represent the Tribe in litigation and
authorize the Tribe to employ legal counsel subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior. The court felt that the statutes provided in effect for an attorney's fee award
in such a situation.
Read broadly, this case suggests that § 2412 can be circumvented whenever the
plaintiff complains of the government's failure to fulfill its duties under the law, leaving it
to operate in cases in which the government acts as an essentially private party. But the
unique features of the case would allow it to be limited to its facts in any future
proceeding.
If the government is codefendant with one or more private parties, the burden of §
2412 on the plaintiff may be entirely removed. The court may simply award attorney's
fees against the private defendants and not against the government, as was done in Sierra
Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
256 Note, supra note 59, at 336 contends:
Logically, one of two things must happen: either judicial discretion to grant fees
on policy grounds [using the substantive approach] will result in universal fee
shifting from the successful party, or the courts will withdraw to the traditional
position, denying any fee transfer without specific statutory authorization.
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interest in terms of the opportunity for every significant interest
to be heard enables the court to award fees to representatives
of those interests that would not otherwise be able to appear."
Thus the court is better able to make a fully informed decision
and all interests affected by that decision will at least be fairly
considered.
In making private attorney general fee awards, courts may
also consider the "necessity of private enforcement" of the policy
or right in question. This allows such awards to be made in
instances where statutory or constitutional rights and policies
would not otherwise be vindicated. This approach, as exemplified in the La Raza and Stanford Daily opinions, applies
aspects of both the substantive and the procedural approaches to
public interest litigation. Legislative or constitutional protection
of a right or policy is a necessary condition to such an award, as
is the court's determination that a party needs the award to be
able to enjoy the benefit of the right or policy in question. Such
awards are fairest when they are assessed against the state or
federal public treasury, since the primary obligation to protect
rights and enforce policies rests with public agencies.
Certain statutory reforms are necessary in order to completely carry out the private attorney general theory of fee
awards. Public funds should be made available out of which
courts could award fees for public interest representation, particularly under the procedural definition of the public interest.
In addition, the federal government as litigant should allow itself
to be assessed for attorney's fees by courts in appropriate cases.
Although these reforms would, not solve all problems of public
interest representation,257 they would constitute a giant step
toward realization of the universal goal of equal justice for all.
III.

FEE AWARDS TO LEGAL SERVICES

As the number of cases in which attorney's fees are awarded
under statutory or equitable authority has increased, questions
have arisen concerning the propriety of such awards to Legal
Services organizations,258 which are financed primarily by federal funds. 259 This Section will explore the legality and desirabil257 For example, these reforms would not meet the problems of financing very
large-scale public interest litigation, where assured financing is needed throughout the
course of the litigation. An assessed fee award at the conclusion of the litigation (if
successful) would not realistically serve the purpose of private attorney general awards in
such cases. Interim financing from public funds has been proposed. See Hearings, supra
note 127 at 842 (Testimony of D. Flannery, Esq.).
258Awarding attorney's fees to Legal Services was first advocated in McLaughlin, The
Recqvery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of FinancingLegal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REv.
761 (1972). That article makes specific suggestions as to when Legal Services might be
awarded fees, especially under New York state law.
259 The first OEO local Legal Services projects were funded in 1965 under general
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ity of such awards, their ability to effectuate policies underlying
fee awards, and the advisability of ever awarding fees against
Legal Services.
A. Legal Services' Financial Need
In civil law countries, legal aid for noncriminal litigation has
a firm statutory basis, is securely built into the structure of
judicial and professional organization, and is reasonably assured
of continuity and long term financial support.2 6 0 By contrast, the
American legal aid system rests on shaky footing indeed. Legal
Services is insufficiently funded and has an excessive caseload
per lawyer. 261 American expenditures on legal aid are less than
twice as high as British expenditures, even though the population is four times larger and the economy eight times greater.2 6 2
Estimates of the legal needs of poor people in the United States
are grossly out of proportion to the resources actually available
to serve them. 263 Two recent New York decisions, in which Legal
Services projects successfully contended that their overwhelming caseloads prevented them from accepting court assigned
divorce 264 and landlord-tenant2 65 cases because of inability to
provide the prompt and adequate representation called for by
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,2 6 6 provide a concrete
illustration of this crisis in resources.
community action provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, §§ 201-11, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2781-837 (1970). In 1966 an amendment to the Act gave specific authorization
for the Legal Services program. See id. § 2809(a)(3).
Under normal circumstances no more than 80% of the cost of a Legal Services
project may be covered by federal sources. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, §
225(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2812(c) (1970). However, under authority granted under § 225(c),
OEO has adopted a rule providing that the federal share of funding may be 90% of costs
for the first 32 months of a community action program, and may permanently be more
than 80% in communities with certain characteristics. See 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.
8020
(1972). The remaining share is contributed in cash or in kind by nonfederal sources
ranging from state legislatures, see id.
8115.30 (Vermont), to private charities and
volunteer help.
The Act requires that all programs be developed, conducted and administered "with
the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups
served." Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, § 202(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2791(0(1) (1970).
260 R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 278 & n.38 (3d ed. 1970).
261
See Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Servicesfor the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseload,
46 J. URBAN L. 217 (1969).
262
See Cappelletti & Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations, Part One, 24
STAN. L. REv. 347, 379 n.210 (1972). This comparison remains meaningful even in the
face of OEO estimates that American-style programs can furnish aid at one-third the cost
of British-style programs, id. 362 n.89, because of the difference in quality of work due to
size of caseload. Id. Part Two, 413 & nn.100-05.
261 Former OEO Director Frank Carlucci has estimated that the Legal Services
program is meeting only 28% of poor people's need for counsel in civil matters. Hearings
on H.R. 40, H.R. 185, H.R. 357, etc. & Oversight on the Administration & Extension of the
Economic OpportunityAct Before the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
1566-67
264 (1971).
See Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 40 App., Div. 2d 1030, 339 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1972)
(mem.).
265 See Tobak v. Mojica, No. 66859-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Term, May 11, 1973), 7
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 167 (1973) (Doc. No. 10,290B).
266 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2.
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Against this ominous background, the possibility of Legal
Services recovering attorney's fees, even if only in a small
number of cases, promises welcome relief. Any fees recovered by
a Legal Services project, generated purely as a byproduct of its
regular operation, could be applied to everyday needs of the
office or, if sufficiently large, to expanding its legal staff. This
would allow Legal Services a better chance of adequately
fulfilling its objective of aiding the poor.2 67 At the same cost
to the taxpayer, Legal Services could operate an expanded
program.
Legal Services has been severely criticized for the way it has
gone about meeting the needs of the poor, apparently because
law reform policies which evolved side-by-side with everyday
client services as the dual thrust of the program struck many
people as being too far removed from the everyday legal needs
of the poor or too threatening to the existing social order.2 6 8
267 The overall objectives of the Legal Services program are:
First: To make funds available to implement efforts initiated and designed by
local communities to provide the advice and advocacy of lawyers for people in
poverty.
Second: To accumulate empirical knowledge to find the most effective method to
bring the aid of the law and the assistance of lawyers to the economically
disadvantaged people of this nation. OEO will encourage and support experiment and innovation in legal services proposals to find the best method.
Third: To sponsor education and research in the areas of procedural and
substantive law which affect the causes and problems of poverty.
Fourth: To acquaint the whole practicing bar with its essential role in combating
poverty and provide the resources to meet the response of lawyers to be
involved in the War on Poverty.
Fifth: To finance programs to teach the poor and those who work with the poor
to recognize problems which can be resolved best by the law and lawyers. The
poor do not always know when their problems are legal problems and they may
be unable, reluctant, or unwilling to seek the aid of a lawyer.
OEO, Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 2 CGH Pov. L. REP.
8010 (19721.
268 Former Vice President Agnew, for example, probably set forth the Nixon
Administration's view of the failings of the Legal Services program when he declared:
[W]hat we have is the Federal Government funding a program designed to
effectuate major political changes. What we may be on the way to creating is a
federally funded system manned by ideological vigilantes, who owe their allegiance not to a client . . . but only to a concept of social reform.
...Isn't it possible that we have gone too far when the Federal Government
constructs a program which encourages individual lawyers to test at public
expense their own individual theories of how society should be structured and
how the resources, rights and benefits of that society should be distributed
among the population?
Agnew, What's Wrong
with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930,
931 (1972).
See also the remarks of Rep. Conlan concerning Legal Services practices.
In this situation there are staff attorneys who are interested in causes. They
concentrate on high impact cases, appeals and class actions ....
In case after case ... these staff attorneys were not taking the bread and
butter cases of helping the poor. What happened to the poor? They were
thrown into the revolving door, out on the streets, because the staff attorneys
did not make enough time.
119 CONG. RFc. 5108 (daily ed., June 21, 1973).
The history of Legal Services is replete with efforts to halt the law reform aspect of
the program. In the late sixties former Senator Murphy of California introduced two
amendments to antipoverty legislation, neither of which passed, to prevent the use of
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Such criticism appears unfounded in light of Legal Services'
impressive national success record of winning eighty percent of
cases litigated, and settling sixteen percent of all cases out of
court. 2 69 The law reform policy was tentatively stated in 1965 as
follows:
In some areas, the law . . . is either unclear or is
detrimental to the interests of the poor. The proposal
should consider the role of the legal service program in
defining or changing such law. This may include judicial challenge to particular practices and regulations,
studies of whole areas of the law in advance, research
into conflicting or discriminatory applications of law or
administrative rules, and
proposals for administrative
27 °
and legislative change.
The award of fees to Legal Services in appropriate cases
would help remove the bases of these arguments against Legal
Services' broad attack on the legal roots of poverty. Many types
of cases in which courts may award fees are cases which have an
impact on classes of people. If fees were awarded to Legal
Services in such cases, it would mean filling real needs of poor
people while at the same time replacing the resources expended.
Thus Legal Services would be able to handle cases of broad
impact without depleting the legal resources available to serve
the "bread and butter" needs of the poor.
The award of fees to Legal Services would thus provide a
much-needed financial boost so that the program could more
adequately provide advice and advocacy for people in poverty.
This is a factor which a judge should consider in determining
Legal Services funds to sue a governmental agency and to give state governors an
absolute veto over a Legal Services program. There have been several cases where state
officials have attempted to halt law reform activity by vetoing programs, although OEO
subsequently overrode the vetoes. ABA SECTION ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & RESPON& STANDING CbMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS.
CORPORATION FOR LEGAL SERVICES 14-15 (1971) (joint informational report).

SIBILITIES

THE

6

'See 119 CONG. REc. 5109 (daily ed. June 21, 1973) (Remarks of Rep. Meeds,
referring to a General Accounting Office report on Legal Services). It is not clear how
much of this success record is due to the careful selection of cases to be litigated.
170 BUREAU OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, INC., A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE RURAL POOR 10 (Draft

Rep. June 1971), quoting U.S. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE, TENTATIVE GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SERVICE PROPOSALS TO THE
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY (1965). The Legal Services Corporation Bill, passed

by the House in June of 1973, 119 CONG. REC. 5067-138 (daily ed. June 21, 1973), seems
specifically designed to thwart these priorities; it would abolish backup centers (regional
research and strategy centers), prohibit administrative and legislative advocacy, and
forbid any Legal Services attorney from engging in partisan or nonpartisan political
work. See H.R. 7824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (973). The Senate version of the Bill, S.2686,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), does not prohibit back up centers and is less restrictive with
regard to political advocacy by Legal Services personnel. It was passed by the Senate in
January of 1974. 120 CONG. REc. S. 905-1012 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974).
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how to exercise 27his
discretion in a case which would normally be
1
fee generating. '
B. Absence of Initial Barriers
1. Proper Recipient
Assuming that an attorney's fee is to be awarded, who would
be the proper recipient in a case in which the winning party is
represented by Legal Services? There are four possible answers
to this question: the client, the attorney, the federal government,
or Legal Services itself.
To pay such an award to the indigent himself, when he has
received legal assistance free of charge, would be to give him an
unwarranted windfall. The district court in White v. King27 2
recognized this when it ruled that it was within the court's
discretion not to award fees, absent a showing that they would be
contributed to the Legal Services organization. On the other
hand, it would be impossible to award fees to the salaried
attorney himself since a Legal Services attorney may not accept
compensation for any case handled in his official capacity or
through Legal Services. 3
The third alternative is to make the award to the contributors of Legal Services' funds. One court considered this
possibility, finding it logical to award the fees to Legal Services'
supporters who "technically should have the right to allocate the
award at their option either to Legal Aid or their own coffers. '274
However, this procedure was rejected because of administrative
problems. A New Jersey court in a divorce action 7 5 made the fee
award payable to the United States Treasury, on the theory that
taxpayers should not have to bear the financial burden when
normally the husband would have to pay his wife's counsel fees.
The question therefore becomes whether Legal Services has a
stronger claim to this potential fund than the taxpayer.
The amount of federal money spent to serve the legal needs
of the poor is properly set by congressional appropriation. However, the federal government is not the sole supporter of Legal
Services as its total funding level is also determined by state and
local appropriations and private contributions. 7 6 To contend
2 71

Cf.Woolfolk v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524, 536 (E.D. Va. 1973) (court took judicial
notice of Legal Services' waiting lists as support for Legal Services' contention that time
spent on contempt motions resulted in the denial of legal services to others).
272319 F. Supp. 122, 127 (E.D. La. 1970).
3
2' See OEO, Guidelinesfor Legal Services Programs, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 8700.44
(1972).4
27 Woolfolk v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524, 536 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1973).
7
2 Ferrigno v. Ferrigno, 115 N.J. Super. 283, 279 A.2d 141 (Ch. 1971).
27 6
See note 259 supra.
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that any fees which are generated by Legal Services -lawyers
should be returned to the federal treasury is to treat the federal
contribution as an investment, which it is not. It is a grant to
provide legal services to the poor, and Congress surely did not
contemplate that it would be partially returned through the
efforts of Legal Services attorneys. Rather, court-awarded
attorney's fees should be viewed as forced supplemental contributions to a local Legal Services organization, channelled
through the judicial system.
Most significantly, the award of fees to Legal Services would
allow a Legal Services attorney the opportunity to increase, by
his skill, the amount of legal aid available to the poor people of
his community, and thereby further the policies implicit in
federal funding of the program. This point is especially important in view of the present financial crisis of Legal Services and
the many pressing needs of the poor.27 Since neither the client
nor the individual attorney has a valid claim to the fee award,
and the federal government has at best a weak one, the most
appropriate recipient of court awarded fees is the local Legal
Services organization.
2.

Competition with the Private Bar

Legal Services organizations would not be entering into
competition with the private bar by accepting court awarded
fees. By*regulation and actual practice, the cases which Legal
Services takes are those which the private bar will not accept,
even though some turn out to be fee generating. The OEO
Guidelines for Legal Services Programs on this issue are clear:
Programs should not provide free legal advice in feegenerating cases, such as contingent fee cases or other
cases in which a fee provided by statute or administrative rule is sufficient to retain an attorney. The test
should be whether a client can obtain representation.
When a case generates a fee sufficient to employ competent private counsel, the client should be referred under
an appropriate lawyer referral system. If the fee is
not sufficient to attract a private lawyer, the client may
277

See Silver, The Imminent Failureof Legal Services or the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46 J. URBAN L. 217, 221 (1969). Silver suggests that 257,800 lawyers would be
needed to serve the poor in the United States, on the assumption that 5 times as much
attorney input is required to provide the same level of representation to poor as to
middle-class dients. As of 1969 there were only 200,600 lawyers in private practice in the
United States. See also note 263 supra.
For the past three years Legal Services has operated on continuing appropriations,
which do not even reflect cost-of-living increases. Interview with Laurence H. Hamblen,
OEO Legal Services Regional Director, Region III, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Dec.
1973.
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be eligible
for the assistance of the OEO-funded
27 8
program.
In Alameda County, California, for example, where Legal Services has referred clients seeking review of welfare hearing
decisions to the County Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service,
the Service has been unable to secure the assistance of private
attorneys2 79 even though the award of fees in such cases is
authorized by statute.2 8 0 The former Western Regional Director
of OEO Legal Services has stated that the private bar is uninterested in such welfare cases. 28 1 Therefore when Legal Services
in Alameda County prevails in a hearing review proceeding and
is awarded fees under the relevant statutory provision,28 2 it has
not taken a fee away from the private bar but has merely
provided legal aid to a person who would otherwise have remained unrepresnted.
The crucial decision, vis-a-vis competition with the private
bar, occurs at the time a case is accepted. Whether or not Legal
Services is awarded attorney's fees upon the completion of a case
is irrelevant to competition, since the case was one which the
private bar was unwilling to take initially. If adequate fees are
consistently awarded to Legal Services, such cases may become
more attractive to private attorneys. Legal Services should be
glad to broaden the base of the struggle against poverty by
turning these cases over to private attorneys, and free its resources to handle other cases which private attorneys will not
handle. If Legal Services organizations continue to refer potentially fee generating cases to the private bar, there will be no
conflict between the acceptance of court awarded fees by Legal
Services and the ban against competition. 3
-78 OEO, GuidelinesforLegal Services Programs,2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 8700.35 (1972).
One commentator has advanced the view that the possibility of a traditional contingent fee arrangement should not make a client ineligible for legal aid when he seeks to
recover only out-of-pocket losses, and would be financially eligible for Legal Services even
after 279
the recovery. See Comment, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 415 (1969).
See Brief for Appellee at 23-24, Bell v. Carleson, Civil No. 1-32930 (Cal. App.,
filed July 17, 1973) (available from National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, Doc. No.
10,782A).
281 CAL. WELF. & INT'NS CODE § 10962 (West 1972).
281 See Brief for Appellee at 22-24, Bell v. Carleson, Civil No. 1-32930 (Cal. App.,
filed July 17, 1973), (quoting affidavit of Thomas Mack). Mr. Mack attributes this lack of
interest to the extreme complexity of welfare law which requires specialized expertise. He
concludes that:
Despite the Legislature's attempt by providing for attorney's fees to stimulate the
interest of the private bar, such cases would not be handled if legal services did
not handle them, except where they come within the limited interests of
organizations like the ACLU, Welfare Rights, NAACP, Synanon, etc.
Id. at 24.
2'2 See, e.g., Bell v. Carleson, Civil No. 426494 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Co. 1972).
283 The extent to which these fee-generating cases involving the poor would be taken
by private attorneys even if fees were consistently awarded is open to question. Fees
awarded in such cases are "reasonable" attorney's fees, in contrast to (usually) higher
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3. The Client's Obligation to Pay His Attorney
Many parties losing to a complainant represented without
cost by Legal Services or pro bono counsel have raised the
objection that it is senseless to award attorney's fees to a person
who does not have to pay his attorney. 8 4 This argument as to
privately funded organizations such as the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and Public Advocates, Inc. has
been rejected by several courts in landmark attorney's fees
28 5
cases.

In Clark v. American Marine Corp., 286 a case in which a major
portion of the plaintiff's case was handled by a staff attorney of
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., the court
held that the relevant consideration was not the presence, absence, or amount of any fee agreement between the lawyer and
his client, but rather the amount of a reasonable fee,2 87 as the
statute provided for the award of fees to the prevailing party
and not to the lawyer. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 288
also participated in by the Legal Defense and Education Fund,
explicitly rejected the argument that an obligation to pay
attorney'9 fees is a condition precedent to the award of fees,
holding that only the existence of an attorney-client relationship
is required. 28

9

The court described this relationship as a status

which exists independently of compensation, giving as one example "the now widespread organized [legal] services on behalf
of the poor. 2 90 Moreover, were courts to require an obligation
contingent fees. Contingent fees are typically in excess of what would be charged if a
straight hourly rate were used, to make up for costs incurred in lost cases for which no

fee is received. See generally ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

DR 2-106(B)(8)

(1969). Also, in many Legal Services cases the recovery is small or relief is injunctive only,
neither of which are likely to generate a very large fee.
Even if a substantial case is won and a fee is awarded, it is unlikely to produce a fee
attractive to a private attorney. For example, in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 410
(M.D. Ala. 1972), a suit which helped to establish minimum constitutional standards for
mental health institutions, the court found $30 per in-court hour and $20 per out-ofcourt hour to be a reasonable basis for computing fees, even though it recognized that
these rates are below normal levels of compensation in private legal practice.
Finally, the lawyer has to contend with the large amount of discretion in setting the
fee award vested in the trial judge, see Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972)
(denial of attorney's fees has typically been overturned "only upon a showing of abuse of
discretion"), which greatly limits the lawyer's remedy when he feels that the award has
been wrongly denied or determined. But see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (greatly narrowing the discretion of the trial judge in certain
situations where fees are authorized by statute).
284 See, e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J.,
dissenting in part).
285 See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Lea
v. Cone
Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
286 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970), affid, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971).
287 For a discussion of the difficulties of determining a "reasonable" fee award, see
Section IV infra.
288 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970).
28
9 See id. at 538-39.
29

0 Id.
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on the part of the client to pay his attorney as a condition
precedent to a fee award, this requirement could easily be
circumvented by a formal agreement limiting the attorney's
compensation to whatever fees might be awarded by the court.2 9 '
Case law therefore indicates that making the client whole is
not the only reason for awarding fees. The fact that a Legal
Services client has no obligation to pay the organization for legal
aid received should be no bar to a court awarded fee to Legal
Services. The fact that private nonprofit organizations were
involved in the cases cited above, rather than governmentfunded Legal Services, should make no difference in the result
when a fee award is mandated by statutory provision or policy.
C. Effectuation of Purposes Underlying Fee Awards
The single most important consideration involved in awarding fees is the effectuation of the policies and purposes behind
the award. Careful examination of the rationales behind the
major equitable exceptions to the restrictive American Rule 292
and certain statutory provisions allowing such awards reveals
that these policies and purposes are served as well, with one
exception, by the award of fees to the litigant represented by
Legal Services as by the award of fees to those represented by
private counsel.
1. Bad Faith and Obstinacy
The first exception to the American Rule is straightforward:
the court may shift the costs of litigation to a party who acted in
bad faith, 293 refused to act rightfully when his duties under the
law were clear,2 9 4 put the opposing party to unnecessary
expense, 29 5 or engaged in frivolous litigation, dilatory tactics or
harassment. 2 96 Included also is the practice of awarding fees to
291 This type of agreement was made by the appellee and Legal Services in Bell v.
Carleson, Civil No. 1-32930 (Cal. App., filed July 17, 1973). See Brief for Appellee at 17,
id.
292 For an extended discussion of the Rule, see notes 1-47 supra & accompany text.
291 See, e.g., Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963).
294 See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1961) (admiralty case).
295 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make specific provision for attorney's fees
to be awarded in such situations. For example, FED. R. CIv. P. 37(c) provides:
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of
any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of
the matter, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to
pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including
reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless ... (3) the
party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on
the
29 6 matter . . ..

See Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 912-13 (1962). For a discussion of the recent
expansion of this exception, see notes 157-63 supra & accompanying text. For a discussion
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the prevailing plaintiff in a contempt action.2 97 The purpose of
such awards seems to be twofold: first, to reimburse one party
for unnecessary litigation expenses, and second, to punish the
party at fault and to deter him and others from such conduct in
the future.2 98
In regard to the first purpose, it is as unjust for a Legal
Services organization to have to use its limited resources to
counteract wrongful conduct and bad faith litigation as it is for a
private party. To deplete unnecessarily such resources frustrates
the legislative goal and diminishes the legal assistance available to
those eligible for Legal Services.
The second purpose, to punish and deter future wrongful
conduct, is of special importance to litigation involving people
eligible for Legal Services. Such people, because of their lack of
economic power, are apt to be especially vulnerable to such
conduct. For example, in Silberzweig v. Masino2 99 a landlord had
brought several false rent proceedings against a tenant within a
few months. The tenant won on a counterclaim for damages for
abuse of process and harassment, and the court granted fees to
Legal Services, which represented the tenant. Particularly when
poor people are involved, obstinacy, harassment and frivolous
claims should be deterred and punished, to deter the opposing
party from taking advantage of the powerlessness of the poor.
Failure to assess fees against a party who acted wrongfully,
merely because the other party was represented by a Legal
Services attorney, in effect thwarts the policy of deterrence
where it is most needed and creates an undeserved windfall for
the party at fault.
Recognition that failure to award fees would nullify this
policy of deterrence was probably the basis for the district court's
award in Quad-Cities Community News Service, Inc. v. Jebens, °° a
of the possible use of an expanded version of this exception to alleviate some of the
problems
created by the American Rule, see notes 87-158 supra & accompanying text.
297
See Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 911-12 (1962).
19' Cases in which counsel fees are taxed against the losing party under a bad faith or
obstinacy rationale are notably reticent about exploring fully the purposes behind such
awards. That one purpose is to compensate the party who has been inequitably forced to
expend funds unnecessarily is explicit. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531
(1961) ("As a result of that recalcitrance libellant was forced to hire a lawyer and go to
court to get what was plainly owed him under laws that are centuries old."). That such an
award also serves to punish the guilty party and deter him from vexatious and oppresive
conduct in the future is implicit. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Gazan v. Vadsco
Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) ("Plaintiff in bringing this action has
Every fisherman, including novices, realizes
been engaged in a fishing expedition ....
that any one who contemplates a fishing trip must be prepared to pay the expenses."). It
has been suggested that the fee is taxed primarily to punish the losing party's bad faith.
See McLaughlin, supra note 258, at 768.
299 164 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1970, at 20 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.).
300 Civil No. 4-989-D (S.D. Iowa 1971). See also Jeffries v. Weaver, No. 70-3196 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (fees awarded to Legal Services in case where counsel was required to attend 3
unnecessary hearings because of defendant's continued delay in carrying out the court's
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suit to vindicate the constitutional rights of the publishers of an
underground newspaper. The court awarded $150 as attorney's
fees to Legal Services lawyers because the defendant police
department deliberately went through the trial process without
any hope of prevailing on the merits, failed to file any pleadings,
and did not make any arguments. The court made no issue of
the fact that the recipient of the fee was a Legal Services
organization. Similarly, in In re Souza 3 0 1 the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit awarded attorney's fees of $250 to Rhode Island
Legal Services under rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Rule 38 provides for damages and award of single or
double costs to an appellee when the court finds an appeal to be
frivolous. The defendants, correctional officials, had failed to
seek a stay or an expedited appeal of a judgment allowing a
physician and photographer into a correctional institution to
obtain proof of plaintiffs injuries from alleged police beatings.
The judgment had been fully implemented by the time of the
appeal, and so the circuit court dismissed it as moot.
In Woolfolk v. Brown,3 0 2 a case noteworthy because it attempts to create a methodology for determining whether to
award fees to a Legal Services organization, 0 3 a contrary result
was reached. Although the court found that the state welfare
department "wilfully, and without reasonable belief in the correctness of their actions and the law, disobeyed and violated an
injunction, ' 30 4 and that an award would have been proper under
the obstinacy exception if plaintiff had been represented by a
private attorney, it found certain policy factors missing which
were requisite, in its view, for an award to Legal Services. 30 5 The
court took judicial notice of Legal Services' waiting lists as support for the argument that time spent on the contempc case
denied legal services to others, but absent the requisite policy
factors the court found insurmountable the problems associated
with the award of fees from the state welfare budget, and did not
find sufficient personal misconduct to hold the defendants perorder). But see Gaddis v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp. f225 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), in which welfare
department officials were found in civil contempt. The court offered as grounds for the
denial of the requested fee award the fact that Legal Services lawyers are OEO funded
and that the attorneys did not use any of their private funds in the suit. An underlying
ground for the denial, however, was that the de endants did not willfully disobey or defy
the injunction. The court found that the defendants' denial of aid was due to burea-

cratic anticipation of new legislation. See id. at 1227.

301 No. 72-1184 (Ist Cir. 1972).
302 358 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 1973).
303 The court suggested that three considerations

were relevant to the award of
attorney's fees: (1) whether the circumstances of the litigation merit attorney's fees under
doctrines of equity as applied to private attorneys and parties; (2) the potential recipient
of an award; and (3) the party to be taxed. Id. at 536-37.
30 4

Id. at 535.

3°5See text accompanying note 306 infra.
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sonally liable. Such a result fails to deter one party from wrongful conduct and fails to compensate the other party for wasted
resources. Whenever fees would be awarded to the client of a
private attorney under an obstinacy rationale, the same considerations support an award to Legal Services.
2. Private Attorney General
The court in Woolfolk did conclude that fee awards to Legal
Services would be proper when certain policy factors are present,
including a statutory expression of congressional intent or strong
precedent indicating that the purpose of an award is either to
make violators rather than victims or the public bear the cost of
enforcement of a policy, or to stimulate private enforcement of a
public policy. 30 6 These factors underlie the private attorney
general rationale for awarding attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs. In accordance with this conclusion, the same court awarded
fees in Jones v. Seldon's Furniture Warehouse, Inc.3 ° 7 to Legal
Services under the attorney's fee provision of the Truth-inLending Act. 30 8 The court found that the statute was intended to
promote private enforcement, and that legislative history expressed a strong public policy in regard to credit transactions.
The court felt that the award to Legal Services was consistent
with the purposes of the legislation:
Creditors will be placed on notice that consumers will
have greater access to help from legal services projects,
which by virtue of an award of fees might be freer to
allocate their time to consumer credit cases. This in turn
may more effectively influence creditors to avoid running afoul of the law.3 9
Other courts have agreed that fees should be awarded to
Legal Services under the private attorney general rationale. In
United States v. Texas, 3 t ° a district court awarded fees to a Legal
Services project in a civil rights case covered by no statutory fee
provision. The decision in a sex discrimination case, Doe v.,
Osteopathic Hospital of Wichita, Inc., 3 11 awarded fees to a legal aid
society under the discretionary fee award provision of Title VII
306 See 358 F. Supp. at 536.

307 357 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Va. 1973).

308 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970). Accord, Settle v. Mallicott Auto Sales, Inc., Civil No.
71-238 (D. Ore. 1972). But see Owens v. Modern Loan Co., Civil No. 7298-A (W.D. Ky.
1972) (illogical to award fees to Legal Services because Legal Services was performing its
intended function, and the principle of such an award, compensation for funds expended, was inapplicable).
309 357 F. Supp. at 888.

310 Civil No. 5281 (E.D. Tex., Apr. 30, 1973).
311 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 197 1).
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.312 And Taylor v. City of
Millington3 13 awarded fees to a Legal Services organization under
section 812(c) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968314 on the authority of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 3 15 the Supreme
3 16
Court archetype of private attorney general litigation.
In conflict with these authorities stands Ross v. Goshi,317 a
freedom of speech case. 3 18 The court, although granting fees
under a private attorney general rationale to plaintiffsintervenors represented by private counsel, denied fees to the
Hawaii Legal Services Project on the ground that Legal Services
attorneys can function as private attorneys general without court
awarded fees because of their government funding. The court,
pointing out that the private attorney general function is one of
the underlying reasons for a Legal Services program, found no
"necessity" for a fee award under the La Raza Unida test:
[W]henever there is nothing in a statutory scheme
which might be interpreted as precluding it, a "private
attorney-general" should be awarded attorneys' fees

when he has effectuated a strong Congressional policy
which has benefited a large class of people, and where

further the necessity and financial burden of private
3 19
enforcement are such as to make the award essential.

It is true that the private, attorney general exception is

intended to promote suits to enforce government policies in
areas which depend on private enforcement, and to compensate

those who litigate in the public interest. 320 In theory, then, Legal
Services does not need fees to motivate and enable it to represent
poor people in areas of special concern to them. It is important
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
Although the court did not discuss the purpose behind the fee provision or the
propriety of awarding fees to Legal Services, awarding fees in Title VII cases has been
interpreted consistently to be an expression of the private attorney general rationale. See,
e.g., Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 710-11 (E.D. La. 1970), affd, 437
F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971).
313 Civil No. 71-249 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
314 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
31 390 U.S. 400 (1968); see notes 132-35, 184 supra & accompanying text.
31
r See also Schuman v. Meyers, No. 210432 (Wash. Super. Ct., Spokane Co., June 5,
1973), where fees were awarded to Legal Services in an action brought under a state
consumer protection statute which contained a discretionary fee provision clause.
3'7351
F. Supp. 949 (D. Hawaii 1972).
318
The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
319 La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
320 In many "public interest" cases only injunctive relief is sought, and the
average attorney or litigant must hesitate, if not shudder, at the thought of
"taking on" an entity such as the California Department of Highways, with no
prospect of financial compensation for the efforts and expenses rendered. The
expense of litigation in such a case poses a formidable, if not insurmountable,
obstacle.
Id. at 101.
312
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to realize, however, that almost all suits to which the private
attorney general rationale is applicable benefit the whole population through the enforcement and improvement of public policy.
As Judge Peckham said in La Raza: "[E]nvironmental protection, housing relocation, and highway construction are nearly
everyone's business, and . . . almost all of society is better 13off
21
when public policies in these areas have been strengthened.
If the wining plaintiff in that case, or in a free speech, civil
rights or due process case, were represented by Legal Services, to
deny fees would result in the poor people of a community
bearing alone, in terms of a reduction in the level of legal
services available to fill their needs, the financial burden of
effectuating strong congressional policies which benefit the
whole population. In order to have the general public rather
than a particular segment of the poor bear the cost, resources
expended by Legal Services in a suit to which the private attorney general rationale was applicable would have to be replaced
by general federal funds. It is illogical to put the cost of enforcement on violators when the plaintiff is represented by
private counsel, and on the public or the poor when the plaintiff
is represented by Legal Services. Fees should also be allowed in
favor of Legal Services and against322the losing party under the
private attorney general rationale.
Contrary to the reasoning of the Ross court, as long as Legal
Services has an excessive caseload 3 and the legal needs of all
the poor are not adequately served, there is a need to award fees
to Legal Services. Denial of fees is a penalty against Legal
Services and detracts from the opportunity of poor people to act
as private attorneys general, with costs to be covered by the
violators of the policy vindicated. The burden of enforcement in
private attorney general cases should not depend upon the
presence or absence of Legal Services attorneys in the case.
Otherwise violators will receive an undeserved windfall in the
form of reduced liability, solely because of Legal Services' presence in the case.
3. Common Fund
A third major equitable exception to the American Rule is
the common fund rationale. Fees are awarded under this
1
321 d. at 100.
322 If the system of fee awards from public funds in private attorney general cases
proposed in the preceding Section were adopted, see notes 248-55 supra & accompanying
text, then Legal Services should receive the award from the public treasury like any other
litigant. As explained in the text, such private attorney general suits benefit the whole
public through the enforcement of public policy, and it would be unjust to tax the poor
for the cost of such suits when it has been determined that the general public should bear
their cost.
323The court in Woolfolk v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524, 536 (E.D. Va. 1973), took
judicial notice of local Legal Services waiting lists.
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rationale out of a fund recovered or maintained by the plaintiff,
on the theory that all who will participate in the fund should pay
the cost of its creation or protection and that this is best achieved
by taxing the fund itself for attorney's fees.3 24 Legal Services
attorneys should not accept fees in most common fund cases,
since Legal Services may not accept fees from clients or receive a
32 5
part of the client's recovery.
The court in Woolfolk v. Brown 32 6 refused for this reason to
award fees under the common fund theory, even though they
could have been awarded under an obstinacy rationale. Assuming that fees could be awarded only from recovered funds
earmarked for distribution to welfare recipients, and not from
the state treasury because of the proscription of the eleventh
amendment, 32 7 the court concluded that it would be inequitable
to tax welfare recipients' benefits to pay attorney's fees to Legal
Services, and that Legal Services would not wish it.328 This
reasoning would be applicable in any common fund case in
which the class to receive the fund is composed of poor people
who need all of the recovery.
In some cases in which fees may be recovered under a
common fund rationale, Legal Services should not be so constrained. There are cases in which fees, although justified on the
basis of a common fund theory, are actually awarded out of
the pocket of the defendant. Sometimes the defendant is seen as
the personification of those who benefited from the fund, 3 29 and
sometimes as the only feasible entity to tax. For example, in
324 For a discussion of the recent expansion of this rationale, see notes 164-83 supra
& accompanying text.
322 For example, Legal Services refuses any fees awarded in connection with Social
Security benefits, as they would come out of the claimant's recovery. Interview with
Laurence H. Hamblen, OEO Legal Services Regional Director, Region III, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Dec. 1973. See also McLaughlin, supra note 258, at 778.
326 358 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 1973).
327
Id. at 537.
Because of the lth amendment proscription, the Woolfolk court concluded that
attorney's fees could only be recovered from funds slated for disbursement to the welfare
recipients, and not from nondistributable funds allocated to the budget of the Virginia
State Welfare Department. The court was not clearly correct in this conclusion. In Sims v.
Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), af'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), the court awarded
attorney's fees against Alabama state legislators and officials under the private attorney
general rationale. It held that the defendants were not immune, because they had
consistently refused to reapportion the state legislature when it was clear that they were
under a duty to do so. The suit was brought to force the defendants to fulfill this duty
and the court concluded that the defendants should be held responsible for the costs of
their deliberate failure to act. Thus, in certain egregious circumstances, fees are awardable against
state officials personally. See also note 253 supra.
28
' See 358 F. Supp. at 537. Strictly speaking, the court's language on
this issue is
dictum, as the case did not satisfy the other criteria for awarding fees to Legal Services.
32
See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (fees awarded against union on the theory that
all union members benefited from plaintiffs suit); Bright v. Philadelphia-BaltimoreWashington Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (fees awarded against the
exchange, justified in part on the theory that the entire exchange and its members had
benefited from plaintiffs suit).
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Brewer v. School Board33 0 the court awarded fees against the
school district, reasoning that although the plaintiffs had created
a "common fund" by securing a right to transportation valued at
sixty dollars per school child per year, which warranted a contribution toward attorney's fees from each school child, to tax the
fees against the benefiting school children would be impractical
and would defeat the basic purpose of the relief, which was to
provide transportation to them without cost. When the defendant is required to pay, even in common fund cases Legal
Services should recover fees the same as a private attorney; Legal
Services would not be breaching its duty to provide legal aid
without charge to its clients, and the rationale behind the fee
award would be served as well as if a private attorney had
handled the case.
Finally, if only a small portion of the recovered fund is to be
distributed to people in a low income category, 33 1 it seems
equitable to award fees to Legal Services when it handles such a
case. Such a case minimizes the problem of Legal Services taking
part of its clients' recovery, since most of those who participate in
the recovery are not real or potential Legal Services clients; it is
only fair that those who could afford to pay a private attorney
share with Legal Services the cost of obtaining that recovery. An
adjustment in the fee or in the distribution of the fund could be
made so that only those who are not within Legal Services'
"constituency" are taxed.
4. A Solution
The three preceding subsections set forth the case for the
award of attorney's fees to Legal Services under the major
rationales for fee awards. Many statutory provisions are
grounded in one or another of these rationales. 3 32 The remaining statutory and common law methods of awarding fees in
certain cases 333 represent policy determinations that the cost of
litigation should be shifted to a particular party in particular
330 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972) (school district must
provide a method of free busing as part of its desegregation plan).
It has been suggested that Brewer should have been discussed under the private
attorney general rationale, id. at 952-54 (Winter, J., concurring specially), but it will be
treated here as a common fund case because that is the terminology used by the court.
331One example of this would be a case in which a plaintiff represented by Legal
Services recovered a monetary fund by challenging illegal price increases in a regulated
industry which affected all consumers alike.
32 Section 204(b) of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)
(1970), exemplifies the private attorney general rationale. See Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). FED. R. App. P. 38 formalizes the sanction against
frivolous appeals. See also Comment, 87 HARV. L. REv. 411, 415 (1973).
333For example, the husband must generally pay the wife's attorney's fees in
matrimonial actions. See H.

CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

14.2 (1968); note 74 supra & accompanying text.
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types of cases. Such policies are equally applicable to litigants
represented by Legal Services, in that neither the taxpayer nor
Legal Services should bear the cost of such an action when it has
been determined to be sound policy that the opposing party bear
the costs. As already noted, the opposing party should not
benefit because Legal Services, and not a private attorney,
handles the case. In view of the legitimate benefits provided by
Legal Services and the lack of barriers to such awards, courts
should routinely award attorney's fees to Legal Services
whenever an award would be appropriate to a party represented
by a private attorney,
making an exception only in certain
3 34
common fund cases.
D. Should It Be a Two Way Street?
Having given the case for the award of attorney's fees to
Legal Services whenever fees would be awarded to a party
represented by a private attorney, the question of fee awards
against Legal Services arises. The most extreme resolution of this
issue is that adopted by the House of Representatives when it
passed an amendment to the Legal Services Corporation Bil 3 3 5
authorizing courts to award costs and. attorney's fees to any
winning defendant sued by a litigant represented by a Legal
Services attorney. Such fees would be paid directly by the Legal
Services Corporation. 33 6 This provision is completely one-sided
(as Legal Services may not routinely collect fees in the cases it
wins as plaintiff's attorney) and seems to be an
attempt to limit
337
indirectly the effectiveness of Legal Services.
A fairer solution to this problem is found in the landmark
English case of Hanning v. Maitland338 which set current English
policy concerning a prevailing litigant who would normally collect fees, but cannot because his opponent is represented by a
legal aid organization. In Hanning a cyclist sued a pedestrian for
" See notes 324-31 supra & accompanying text.

335 H.R. 7824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see 119 CONG. REC. 5103 (daily ed., June

21, 1973).
33
6 See id. 5102.
337 At least two justifications are given for this amendment. First, it is said to be
inequitable for the federal government to sponsor suits against private individuals who
end up paying their own attorney's fees even if they win; second, that the threat of
paying fees in all losing cases would restrain Legal Services attorneys from taking
frivolous cases and appeals. See id. 5103 (Remarks of Rep. Green).
Neither argument is very convincing. While it is laudable for Congress to be
concerned with the burden imposed upon those who must litigate against a party
subsidized by government funds, such concern has not manifested itself in other
somewhat analogous cases where the individual must contend with federally supported
opponents (e.g., successful criminal defendants or those who successfully sue for tax
refunds). Also, it is hard to believe that frivolous litigation is a problem in an organization
such as Legal Services, which only loses 12% of its cases. See id. 5109 (Remarks of Rep.
Meeds, referring to a General Accounting Office report on Legal Services).
338 [1970] 2 W.L.R. 151 (C.A.).
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injuries incurred when he ran into the pedestrian at the road's
edge. The cyclist was represented by legal aid and the pedestrian, though of very modest means, had to retain private counsel. The Legal Aid Act of 1964 provided for payment, out of the
Legal Aid Fund, of costs incurred by successful opponents of
legally-aided litigants where certain conditions were met: (1) that
in the absence of legal aid the successful party would have been
awarded costs, (2) that it be just and equitable under all the
circumstances to pay costs out of public funds, and (3) that
the unassisted party would suffer severe financial hardship
otherwise. 3 9 The Hanning court reinterpreted the Act so that
the financial hardship criterion would exclude only the wealthy,
insurance companies and prosperous corporations; and indicated that fees should be awarded in every case regardless of
fault on the part of the legal aid committee or attorney. In this
way a successful litigant would not be financially disadvantaged
because the other party was an indigent represented by legal aid.
Although England follows the winner-take-all rule 34 0 and
the Legal Aid Fund may recover fees from a losing party just as
any other litigant,34 ' Hanning may be relevant to American
policy if read to say that legal aid organizations should be treated
the same as a losing nonindigent party with regard to the award
of attorney's fees against it. In the United States, applying such a
rule would result in an award of fees against Legal Services only
in those cases where a fee would have been awarded against a
party represented by private counsel. It is evident that this policy
could be fairly applied only if Legal Services could in general be
awarded fees in cases where a person represented by a private
attorney would receive them. Such an added financial burden on
an already underfunded program could have the effect of forcing Legal Services to turn down cases which, although possibly
meritorious, promise a slight chance of winning and a larger
chance of an adverse fee award. Presumably, however, given the
highly successful court record of Legal Services, fees recovered
would more than cover those which had to be paid out. If in the
case of a particular local project this favorable ratio were not
so
established, help from the national budget would be in order3 42
as not to jeopardize the everyday operation of that project.
"' See id. at 154. The previously controlling precedent, Nowotnik v. Nowotnik,
[1965] 3 W.L.R. 920 (C.A.), had strictly limited the use of the 1964 Act, by excluding
awards to persons who would not suffer "severe financial hardship" unless the award was
made and by construing 'just and equitable" to mean that the winning litigant be
awarded only as much as he would have gotten out of the fund if he were an assisted
person. See [1970] 2 W.L.R. at 155.
340 For a brief explanation of English fee award practices, see note 7 supra.
341 See Jolowicz, Fundamental Guaranteesin Civil Litigation: England, in FUNDAMENTAL
GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 121, 152 (M. Cappelletti & D. Tallon

eds. 1973).
342 This problem might also be solved by awarding fees against a Legal Services
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The number of cases in which fee awards could legitimately
be made against Legal Services projects under this system would
probably be small, generally being limited to frivolous litigation
and enforcement of contracts which include an attorney's fee
clause, such as leases 3 43 or security agreements. Such a policy,
however, would open the door to the possibility that judges
unfavorably disposed to Legal Services attorneys3 44 would award
excessive fees or exercise their discretion more broadly than
usual to deter certain types of suits.
Furthermore, the Legal Services-assisted indigent will seldom, if ever, be a defendant in a fee award case. For example,
the strongest national policy supporting the award of fees is
aimed at facilitating suits by plaintiffs where there is an important public interest involved 345 and indigents are not defendants
in such suits. Thus to recognize that the political frailty and
limited budget of the Legal Services program are such that fees
should never be awarded against local projects would not seriously impede the national policy supporting such plaintifforiented equitable and statutory exceptions to the American
Rule. In the ideal world of a financially sound Legal Services
program, fees could be awarded against Legal Services the same
as against any private litigant. Such, however, is not the state of
the Legal Services program in the United States in 1974. In
addition to furthering the policies behind fee awards, awards to
Legal Services would augment the meager Legal Services budget
at no additional cost to the taxpayer. To partially nullify this
project only if they could be paid out of the fund created by winning fee award cases.
Among people who obtained fee awards, however, this might be an unfair method of
distribution because whether a particular litigant would actually get fees would depend
on the status of the fund at the time of that particular fee award.
343 Under New York law when there is such a clause benefiting the landlord in a
lease in New York City, a covenant is implied that the landlord will have to pay the
tenant's reasonable fees and costs if the tenant should prevail in litigation. See N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1968).
'44 That many judges are in fact hostile to program goals and Legal Services staff
attorneys is documented in Stumpf & Janowitz, Judges and the Poor: Bench Responses to
Federally Financed Legal Services, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1058 (1969).
345 The rationales of private attorney general and common benefit were developed to
aid only prevailing plaintiffs. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970),
the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, id. § 501(b) (1970), the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 id. § 1640(a)(2) (1970), and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 id. §
3612(c) (1970), for example, provide for the award of fees only to prevailing plaintiffs.
Even where the statute is worded so as to allow fees to a prevailing plaintiff or defendant,
a court may look behind the words to the purpose of the provision and decline to award
fees to a winning defendant. In Richardson v. Hotel Corp., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La.
1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972), the defendant moved for attorney's fees under
such a fee provision contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k) (1970). The court found that the award was not justified as the plaintiff had
proceeded in forma pauperis and in good faith in an attempt to vindicate statutory rights
and that the award would serve only as possible "precedent in terrorem to discourage other
Title VII plaintiffs." 332 F. Supp. at 521-22. But see United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp.
871 (D.R.I. 1970) (fees awarded to successful defendant against federal government in a
racial discrimination suit the court found to be meridess).
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desirable effect by awarding fees against Legal Services, even
though limited to certain types of cases, would be undesirable.
E.

Conclusion

Brown 34 6

In Woolfolk v.
the court suggested that in order to
award fees when Legal Services is the potential recipient special
public policy factors must be present, even though fees would be
awarded without such additional factors if a private attorney
were involved. The analysis in this Section leads to the simpler,
more rational result that a court should award fees to Legal
Services whenever they would be awarded to a party represented
by a private attorney, with the one exception that an award
would be improper if it would reduce the recovery of Legal
Services clients. Such an organization is a proper recipient of
fees; there is no threat of competition with the private bar; the
awards would increase the legal aid available to eligible clients in
a program with ambitious goals but inadequate funding; and,
most significantly, only such awards can adequately and fairly
accomplish the purposes sought to be achieved by the particular
fee award rationale involved. Awarding fees against Legal Services, however, involves different considerations which on balance lead to the conclusion that at this time such a practice is
ill-advised and not compelled by any strong policy.
At present the number and variety of cases in which
attorney's fees are awarded may seem limited, so the question of
awarding fees to Legal Services may not appear particularly
significant. But viewed in terms of the rapid expansion of cases
covered by statutory and equitable exceptions to the American
Rule, and the large impact a few fee awards could have on a local
Legal Services office, the issue emerges as important. A proper
resolution will serve both to avoid the unjustified, inconsistent
treatment of losing litigants in similar situations merely because
Legal Services represents some winners, and to facilitate the
enforcement of the rights of the poor through peaceful legal
means. That this furthering of the aims of Legal Services is a
highly desirable end was well expressed by Representative Koch
347
in the House debates on the Legal Services Corporation Bill:
Is it not to be preferred that there be a cutting edge
for social change applied through the courts rather than
through riot and upheaval in the streets, and is it not
helpful in terms of testing and changing the law that
those who could not34afford
lawyers are provided with
8
those legal services?
346358 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 1973).
347 H.R. 7284, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
148 119 CONG. Rac. 5097 (daily ed., June 21, 1973).
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IV.

CALCULATING

A.

THE FEE AWARD

Introduction

The size of a court awarded attorney's fee may seem to be of
subordinate importance. Yet whether statutory or equitable
principle mandates a fee award to a victorious plaintiff 34 9 or
vests in the court discretion to make such an award,350 it is the
size of the fee award which will for practical purposes determine
whether the underlying public purposes are to be frustrated or
3
fulfilled. 5
Ideally, litigating parties could agree upon an appropriate
fee award. In the absence of agreement between the parties, the
352
burden falls on the court to determine an appropriate fee.
Unfortunately, the guidance accorded a conscientious trial judge
in discharging this burden has been minimal. Suggestions for the
proper method of assessing the "reasonable" award have ranged
from awarding an amount equal to what a victorious attorney

would reasonably charge his client 353 to awarding the plaintiff an

amount equal to the legal expenses of the defendant. 3 54 Em-

phasis in such proposals has varied from strict attention to the
size of the plaintiff's recovery 35 5 to nearly exclusive focus upon
the number of hours spent on the case. 35 6 Statutes have provided
no more helpful calipers for reasonableness: some have confided

the question to unfettered judicial discretion,357 while others
have required the courts to interpret such unhelpful phrases as
33 See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
'See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
'" See Note, supra note 97, at 400.
'5.See Jones v. Seldon's Furniture Warehouse, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 886, 888 (E.D. Va.
1973) (Truth-in-Lending); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 693 n.3 (M.D. Ala.), affd,
409 U.S. 942 (1972).
" See Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 242,
244 (D. Mass. 1954). This method, although not inconsistent with the theory of fee
awards, tends to minimize downward pressure on contingent fee agreements and may
lead to "sweetheart" fee arrangements between client and attorney. It has been rejected
by most courts. See, e.g., Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 570 (7th
Cir. 1951).
4
3 5 See Memorandum in Support of Award of Expenses and Attorney's Fees at 26-27,
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, No. 72-1796-98 (D.C. Cir., filed Feb. 23, 1973).
" See, e.g., Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 166 F. Supp. 865
(D.D.C. 1955), rev'd & cross-appealconcerningattorney'sfre award dismissed as moot, 243 F.2d
418, 421 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). This method has been rejected by
most courts on the theory that placing primary importance on the size of a recovery
results in either inadequate or excessive awards. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd witih respect to fee award, 449 F.2d 51,
79 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Illinois v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
'36 See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
940 (1973). Several courts have rejected this approach, finding the complexity of the legal
problems and the skill and success of counsel more important considerations in measuring the value of legal services. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 F.
Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd with respect to fee award, 449 F.2d 51, 79 (2d Cir.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
357See, e.g., Truth-in-Lending Act § 130(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970).
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"reasonable part of the recovery. ' 35 8 Even plaintiffs or defendants as a class are unlikely to espouse a consistent philosophy
regarding the factors which should govern fee awards. Where
there is a large recovery a plaintiff is likely to ask for a fee award
pegged to a percentage of the recovery, while the defendant will
plead that an hourly rate best establishes a "reasonable" award.
Where only a small recovery is involved,
however, the disputants
59
are likely to reverse positions.
B.

The Vagaries of "Reasonableness"

Current judicial practice in awarding attorney's fees fails to
give close attention to fundamental purposes underlying the
award of attorney's fees. 3 60 Though current awards are made
under a variety of rationales, courts do not appear even to have
considered the possibility that the differing rationales could
justify differing methods of fee calculation. Trial judges have
frequently awarded fees without ever stating the criteria by
which those fees were calculated, and appellate review of trial
court awards has been as narrow as the trial court discretion has
been broad. 3 61 The clearest guiding principle that has emerged
is that awards cannot be calculated by any simple formula.3 6 2
Recent cases do seem to indicate a general rejection of the
philosophy which suggested that fee awards be determined by a
specified percentage of a plaintiff's recovery.3 63 An occasional
court will award fees on the basis of a percentage of assessed
damages: in Jurinko v. Wiegand Co.,3 64 for example, the court
ordered that the attorneys be awarded $3,946, or twenty-five
percent of the damages suffered by their clients. This approach,
however, is atypical, and is unlikely to be applied in cases in
which more substantial damages are awarded.
The presently predominant method of calculating a court
awarded attorney's fee is partially exemplified by a recent case
involving section four of the Clayton Act,3 65 an old and muchlitigated provision for such awards. Victorious after a complex
358See, e.g., Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act § 50 1(b), 29 U.S.C. §
501(b) (1970).
'"Compare Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258,
302 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated with respect tofee award, 377 F.2d 776, 793 (3d Cir. 1967),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 392 U.S. 481 (1968), with Advance Business Systems &
Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143, 160 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part & remanded
for modification on other grounds, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970).
3 60
See 2A

J.

SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.06, at 474

(4th ed. C. Sands 1973). See also Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
361See Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100, 111 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919
(1973).
362 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1972).
363 See note 355 supra.
364 3 Fair Emp. Practices Cas. 944 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
365 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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trial, plaintiffs in Pacific Coast Agricultural Association v. Sunkist
Growers, Inc.3 66 requested an award of over $250,000. Defendants contended that reasonable fees would range between
$36,000 and $85,000, or between fifteen and thirty-five percent
of actual damages. The court, emphasizing that any fee award
must depend upon the highly particular facts of a case, found
eight factors relevant:
(1) whether plaintiffs counsel had the benefit of a
prior judgment or decree in a case brought by the
Government, (2) the standing of counsel at the bar
-both counsel receiving the award and opposing counsel, (3) time and labor spent, (4) magnitude and complexity of the litigation, (5) responsibility undertaken,
(6) the amount recovered, (7) the knowledge the court
has of the conferences, arguments that were presented,
and of work shown by the record to have been done by
the plaintiff prior to trial, [and] (8) what it would 3be
6 7
reasonable for counsel to charge a victorious plaintiff.
Without making clear exactly how it had utilized these eight
criteria, the court rejected the defendant's percentage formula as
creating only an illusion of fairness and precision. Instead it
awarded a fee of $194,700, finding that plaintiffs counsel had
spent 3700 hours on the case, and allowing a hybrid hourly rate
of $46.368
Although Sunkist placed considerable emphasis upon the
hourly rates of counsel, it is clear that most courts will not regard
such rates as determinative in the computation of a fee award,
partly out of fear that if final reliance were placed on such rates,
"economy of time may cease to be a virtue. ' 369 Courts have,
moreover, felt that factors other than inefficiency frequently
make it necessary to discount the fee award computed by multiplying an attorney's hourly rate by the number of hours he
invested in research and litigation.
Even where attorneys have reasonably claimed that their
research was novel and time consuming, for example, courts have
1973-1 Trade Cas. T 74,523, at 94,342 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Id. at 94,343 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 245
F. Supp. 258, 302-03 (M.D. Pa 1965), vacated with respect to fee award, 377 F.2d 776 (3a
Cir. 1967), rev'd in part on other grounds, 392 U.S. 481 (1968). For an enunciation of
similarly vague criteria, see Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711-12
(E.D. La. 1970), aJfd, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Bradley v. School Bd., 53
F.R.D. 28, 42-43 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412
U.S. 937 (1973), in which Judge Merhige also applied similar criteria, citing Campbell
County y.Howard, 133 Va. 19, 112 S.E. 876 (1922) for surprisingly antiquated doctrinal
support.
368 The court computed this rate on a weighted average of $75 for lead counsel, $60
for partners, and $35-$50 for associates. 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,523, at 94344 n.2 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
369 See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1972)
quoting Hornstein, supra note 42, at 660.
366
67

3
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noted that the ,absence of existing precedent, while sometimes
necessitating a tedious search for analogous precedent, may on
other occasions eliminate hours of research.3 70 Others have
noted that abnormal time spent in research may be regarded as
an investment in legal acumen which will prove useful in later
litigation. 3 7 ' Still others have noted that even attorney's fee
provisions intended to promote civil rights were not designed as
punitive measures which would put guilty defendants out of
business, but were meant only to compensate for the cost of
bringing antidiscrimination actions. On that basis, Black v.
Bonds 37 2 refused to assess even a requested $1,000 fee against a
small discriminatory cafe.
and
Other case law indicates that time spent researching
37 4
will
litigating unsuccessful claims 373 or upon duplicated work
frequently be deducted from the actual number of hours spent
on a case in arriving at the number of hours on which- an
attorney's fee award may be based. In Trans World Airlines v.
Hughes,37 5 however, the court refused to limit an award of
attorney's fees to the time and effort necessary to prove the items
of damage ultimately sustained by the trier of fact. The Hughes
court held that hours spent preparing other claims for which
recovery was denied should be considered in the award, since
recovery was not denied for failure of proof, but because the
court rejected a theory of damage measurement reasonably
advanced by the plaintiff. 376 Since new theories of liability 377 and
damages are constantly evolving and frequently necessary to the
continued vitality of old law, the Hughes court's position seems
37 8
well-advised. A contrary result would penalize the creative,
and confuse innovation with inefficiency.
370 United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871, 873 n.21 (D.R.I. 1970).
171 E.g., Vogel v. Trans World Airlines, 5 Fair Emp. Practices Cas. 379 (W.D. Mo.
1971).
372308 F. Supp. 774, 776 (S.D. Ala. 1969).
373 See Vandervelde v. Put and Call Brokers & Dlrs. Ass'n, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Bowl America Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080, 1100
(D. Md. 1969); Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143,
161 (D. Md. 1968), af'd & remandedfor modification on other grounds, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk
Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476,489; Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 207 F. Supp. 856, 864
(D. Md. 1962), rev'd & remanded on other grounds, 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
374 See, e.g., Pacific Coast Agric. Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 1973 Trade
Cas. 74,523, at 94,344 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Bowl America, Inc., v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 1080, 1100 (D. Md. 1969); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287
F. Supp. 143, 161 (D. Md. 1968), afd & remandedfor modification on other grounds, 415
F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
375 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd with respect to fee award, 449 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir. 376
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
Id. at 482-83.
377 See, e.g., Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 207 F. Supp. 856, 864 (D. Md. 1962),
rev'd 3&
remanded on other grounds, 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
7
' See Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Glass Action Antitrust Litigation, 60
CAL. L. REv. 1656, 1667 (1972).
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Thus, careful analysis should be used in reducing the total
number of hours spent on a case to some lesser total upon which
the fee award will be based. Although the cost of time spent
preparing patently meritless claims will not be forced upon a
defendant-even one guilty of other illegality-courts are unlikely to require an attorney to possess superhuman prescience
the exact legal services
and assess early in the history of a case
37 9
which will prove absolutely necessary.
The small size of a plaintiff's recovery has occasionally been
found to justify reduction of a fee. 380 The propriety of this
practice is questionable, since it may discourage small claimants
from vindicating even clear legal rights. 381 Fees awarded on a
private attorney general or common benefit rationale, 38 2 in particular, are awarded for the very reason that the rights in dispute
do not concern only the named parties, 38 3 and that the monetary
damages awarded in such litigation are not likely to reflect the
true benefits. 3 84 For these reasons, the limited size of a monetary
recovery should not justify reduction of an otherwise "reasonable" fee award in such circumstances. It should similarly not result
in the reduction of awards made under an obstinate party
rationale, 3 85 or otherwise premised upon the bad faith of the
losing litigant, simply to effectuate the policies those rules
3 86
embody.
379 In Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1020 (1971), for example, the Seventh Circuit indicated its belief that legal services
which appear unnecessary in retrospect may be considered in an award unless they were
Id. at 878-79.
"manufactured."
380
See Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972); Bates
v. Hinds, 334 F. Supp. 528, 533 (N.D. Tex. 1971). Thus, in Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp.
683, 686 (D. Minn. 1971), although a fee of $11,280 would have been computed under a
minimum fee schedule, the court awarded only $1,000, noting that its damage award had
been only $4,000. But cf. Ratner v. Chemical Bank, 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(parties' agreement on a sizeable settlement for attorney's fees probably influenced the
court to forbid maintenance of class action, limiting attorney-plaintiff to $100 statutory
damages under Truth-in-Lending).
381 Cf text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
See text accompanying notes 325-29 supra.
38?
38 3
See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (civil
rights);
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (environmental).
384
See Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 952-53 (4th Cir.) (Winter, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972); Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 220 F.
Supp. 735, 737-38 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (under § 501(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting
& Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970), which permitted an award of a "reasonable
part of the recovery," the court granted a $38,000 fee award despite a monetary recovery
under $25,000, interpreting "recovery" to include total benefits of the litigation, not
merely plaintiff's monetary relief). See also Hammond v. Housing Authority, 328 F. Supp.
586, 588 (D. Ore. 1971).
385
See text accompanying notes 293-96 supra.
38
6See note 112 supra & accompanying text. Two other considerations deserve
mention. At one extreme, a plaintiff cannot expect any award of attorney's fees until a
decision on the merits is reached. See Young v. ITT, 5 Fair Emp. Practices Cas. 19 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
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C. A Suggested Change
While the abstract criteria used by modern courts in calculating awards of attorney's fees are sound at the theoretical level,
their very abstractness has afforded courts virtually unlimited
discretion in their application. The very existence of such a
multiplicity of discretionary factors has generally made it impossible to predict with any assurance what will be awarded in any
particular case. The consequent difficulties of estimation are a
problem not only for the practitioner but for the trial judge:
Any Court approaches the problem of an attorneys
fee with trepidation. Anyone who has had the benefit of
the experience of a dozen partners expressing an opinion on a fee knows that the answers are going
to be a
3 87
dozen, ranging hundreds of per cents apart.
Since trial court discretion has been disturbed only upon
proof of its abuse, 38 8 and since a discussion of abstract criteria
does not generally provide a record which is reviewable,3 8 9 even
courts that are generous in their awards have not demonstrated
consistency in measuring fees. 390 A particularly troubling consequence has been the lack of consistently adequate fee awards in
areas such as civil rights litigation where they
are necessary to
391
spur the private bar to active participation.
Several commentators have suggested the need for more
sharply defined standards for the awarding of attorney's fees. 3 92
Even less significant departures from current practice, however,
would not only increase consistency in attorney's fee awards, and
provide awards which would reasonably reimburse plaintiffs and
At the other, a plaintiff forced to protect a damage recovery through appellate
proceedings may not, at least in antitrust litigation, be entitled to the same monetary rate
for appellate as for trial court work. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973), for example, the Ninth Circuit declared that an
award need not fully reimburse a plaintiff for his counsel fees on appeal, since such an
award was made only to prevent undue shrinkage of the plaintiffs damage award from
the costs of appeal. Id. at 553. Noting that antitrust litigation is most complex in its earlier

stages and that fee awards on appeal should generally be less than those for trial work
(the latter had been at the rate of $46 per hour) the Ninth Circuit found an hourly rate
of $40 to reflect the contributions of various attorneys employed for the appeal, id. at 554
n.7, rejecting the district court's award for appellate services, computed at rates of over
$85 per hour. Given that a successful antitrust plaintiff will be awarded treble damages,
this "undue shrinkage" argument seems inapposite to other appellate proceedings.
187 Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 2 Fair Emp. Practices Gas. 180 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
38 See, e.g., Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 48 (1904); Cato v. Parham, 403
F.2d 3812, 16 (8th Cir. 1968).
9 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478, 480-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd with respect to fee award, 449 F.2d 51, 79 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
409 3U.S.
363 (1973).
0
9 See Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in PrivateAntitrust
Suits, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 363, 412 (1954) ("there are nearly as many notions of what is
reasonable as there are judges"); Comment, supra note 378, at 1657.
391 See Note, supra note 97 at 404.
392
See, e.g., id., 410-11; Comment, supra note 378, at 1668.
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lawyers for the expenses of litigation, but would also provide
appellate courts with the record necessary to insure that the
purposes of such awards are consistently served. 3 93 The mere
requirement of a systematic application of current guidelines, for
example, combined with a requirement that trial courts conduct
an evidentiary hearing at which are made certain basic factual
findings essential to intelligent fee awards, should allow continued broad judicial discretion, while affording practitioners
some ability to predict fee awards. This systematic calculation of
the fee award would, moreover, focus new attention upon the
adequacy or inadequacy of such awards in attracting necessary
participation by the private bar.
Appellate courts should regularly demand that trial courts
conduct a brief evidentiary hearing and make specific findings
concerning factors essential to a basic fee calculation. These
would include: the total number of hours actually spent on a
case;3 94 the number of hours which must be subtracted for
unsubstantiated claims, wasted effort or unwarranted start-up
39 6
research; 3 95 experience, reputation and usual fees of counsel,
and the extent and quality of their work; 3 97 and applicable
191 It should be noted that appellate courts have recently been less inhibited in
remanding fee award determinations when the record provides an inadequate basis for
determining the "reasonableness" of an award.,See, e.g., Dillon v. Berg, 42 U.S.L.W. 2101
(filed Aug. 8, 1973). Much concern has been with excessive awards, see, e.g., Ellis v. Flying
Tiger Corp., No. 71-1704 (7th Cir. 1972), but there has also been growing concern with
insufficient awards. See, e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 467 F.2d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1972)
(Winter, J., dissenting).
The Fifth Circuit, moreover, has recently gone so far as to find it an abuse of
discretion for a trial court, which had unexplainedly disallowed a substantial number of
attorney hours, not to have expressly considered the broad discretionary factors approved in Clark v. American Marine Co., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d
959 (5th Cir. 1971). See note 367 supra & accompanying text. Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., No. 72-3294 (5th Cir., Jan. 21, 1974), vacating and remandingfee
award, 5 Fair Emp. Practices Cas. 776 (N.D. Ga., Aug. 8, 1972).
...See Philadelphia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 345 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(antitrust class action settlement); Blankenship v. Boyle, 337 F. Supp. 296, 302 (D.D.C.
1972); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 322 F. Supp. 375 (D. Ore. 1971), modified, 474 F.2d
549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
05 See Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 467 F.2d 277, 279 (4th Cir. 1972). In making this
finding, a court could rely upon the testimony of expert witnesses; in their absence,
however, it would presumably be competent to make the finding itself.
396 See id. at 280 (Winter, J., dissenting); United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871
(D.R.I. 1970); Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp.
242, 244 (D. Mass. 1954); Note, supra note 97, at 411.
Several recent cases demonstrate judicial adjustment of hourly rates according to the
experience of counsel-in particular, counsel's status in a law practice. See Pacific Coast
Agric. Export Ass'n v. Sunldst Growers, Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. 74, 523, at 94,344 n.2
(N.D. Cal. 1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549, 553-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 940 (1973).
Under this formula, of course, equal success in the courtroom will not necessarily be
rewarded by equal compensation: the successful fledgling attorney will receive a lesser
award than a more established colleague.
397 See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 4 Fair Emp. Practices Cas. 72 (C.D. Cal.
1972) (court stressed the value of counsel's having quickly brought the coures attention to
the legal issues); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 712 (E.D. La. 1970)
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minimum fee rates in the locality. 398 Having applied these factors to compute a basic fee, the court can then apply appropriate
discounting procedures, 39 9 so long as it enumerates its reasons
for doing so. Finally, the court should consider allowing additional compensation to reflect the contingent nature of such fee
awards and the need to encourage particular types of litigation.
1. The Contingency Element
Whether the purpose of awarding attorney's fees is seen as
making a litigant whole 400 or as encouraging the private bar to
participate actively in certain types of litigation, 40 - that purpose
is in some measure defeated if the attorney does not receive full
and fair compensation adequate to induce him to take cases on
the expectation of receiving such awards. The Supreme Court
noted in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,Inc. 40 2 that exceptional
circumstances may warrant the denial of fee awards; so too may
exceptional circumstances warrant a fee based on less than the
customary charges of the private bar. 40 3 In most instances, however, a court awarded attorney's fee should reflect not only the
customary charges of the bar 40 4 but the contingencyof compensation. An attorney's compensation may be considered contingent for present purposes whenever success is prerequisite to
his being paid. Whether he expects a fee award out of the
defendant's pocket or the more traditional percentage of
(minimum fee rate felt insufficient to compensate counsel for handling a complex civil

rights case with. brevity and skill); Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 220 F.
Supp. 735, 738 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (award should reflect the fact that case was "1one of first

impression and required more than the usual efforts and skill on the part of counsel");
Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 242, 244 (D. Mass.
1954) 8 (antitrust).
39 See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). These rates would be substituted for the usual fee of counsel
in cases where, for example, Community Legal Services was the plaintiff, with the result
that standard charges would be unavailable. They should, moreover, act as a floor for the
hourly rate component of fee awards, and be applied only where such rate component is
in doubt. See Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 467 F.2d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1972) (Winter, J.,
dissenting). See also note 396 supra.
'9'
4 See notes 370-74 supra & accompanying text.
' See text accompanying note 372 supra.
401 One purpose of fee awards is to encourage the private enforcement of public
policy. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549; 553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 940 (1973) (Clayton Act); Jones v. Seldon's Furniture Warehouse, Inc., 357 F.
Supp. 886, 887 (E.D. Va. 1973) (Truth-in-Lending Act); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57
F.R.D. 94, 100-01 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (award under court's equitable powers in environmental action); Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 292, 298 (D. Mass. 1943)
(Fair Labor Standards Act).
402 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
successful plaintiff should recover an attorney's fee "unless special circumstances would
render
such an award unjust").
4
" See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 n.13 (1973) (financial condition of defendant labor
union was a proper consideration in assessing a fee award made under the court's equity
power).
404 See also note 372 supra & accompanying text.
See note 396 supra & accompanying text.

1974]

ATTORNEY'S FEES

plaintiff's recovery, the economic effect is the same: if he is to
earn an "average" hourly rate he must be overcompensated in
successful cases to make up for unpaid losing efforts. °5
The fact that compensation is dependent on recovery has
not generally been reflected in court awarded attorney's fees.40 6
One result of this nonrecognition, in private attorney general or
other public interest litigation, is that attorneys who cannot
afford to absorb the lost fees are discouraged from pursuing
such litigation: in cases in which only injunctive relief is at stake,
victory will only assure counsel of a basic hourly-computed40 7fee,
If
while no fee at all will be available should the suit fail.
counsel is nevertheless to be induced to take such cases, the
deficiency must be made up out of the client's pocket.40 8 Either
result is likely to deter vindication of protected rights.
An attorney depends upon his fees for his livelihood. In
cases in which a potential plaintiff is incapable of assuring an
attorney of payment in the event of defeat, it has been the
contingent fee which, for all its defects, 40 9 has kept open the
courthouse door. Payment of sums in excess of the fee which
would be derived by multiplication of hours spent on a case by
customary hourly rates has long been deemed reasonable by the
American Bar Association,4 10 in recognition of the fact that an
attorney will invariably have expended his efforts in other cases
without recompense.
Recently, in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp.,411 the Third Circuit departed
405 See Hornstein, supra note 168, at 660.
4 01

But see, e.g., Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (lst Cir. 1959). In Angoff, a
stockholders' derivative suit, the court noted one factor to be considered in a fee award
was "the contingent nature of the fees, with the accompanying risk of wasting hours of
work, overhead and expenses (for it is clearly established that compensation is awarded
only in the event of success)." See also Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D.
221, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Since a main purpose of a contingency calculation is to remove disincentives to
particular types of litigation, it would seem inappropriate to make such a calculation for
fees awarded under a bad faith or obstinacy exception to the American Rule, see notes
50-58, 293-98 supra & accompanying text. Such cases would be indistinguishable from
ordinary private litigation but for the bad faith of the opposing litigant. Since the
expense occasioned by such bad faith will be compensated for in an hourly-calculated fee
award, disallowance of the contingency multiplier will create no disincentive vis-i-vis
ordinary private litigation.
4017This will generally be the case where class action suits are concerned. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 223 (S.D. Ill. 1972) (antitrust
class action suit). Even in non-class-action antitrust litigation in which plaintiffs could
afford to retain counsel at an hourly rate, a typical fee arrangement calls for compensation only upon success. See Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ABA
ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 93 (1966).
4"See, e.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 87 n.58
(1st Cir.
1969).
409
See notes 108-11 supra & accompanying text.
41 0
See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBrLTY, DR 2-106(B)(8) (1969), recogniz-

ing that the contingent nature of compensation is a factor to be considered in assessing
the reasonableness of a fee.
411 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
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significantly from current practice to observe that a fee award
based solely on hourly rates may fail to fully compensate a
plaintiff when his attorney's compensation is set by contract on a
contingent fee basis. In those cases in which attorney's fees are
most frequently awarded-class actions, 412 civil rights suits, 413
and environmental suits, 41 4 for example-the availability of this
contingent fee is essential to the availability of counsel. Facing
this need, the Lindy court noted the need to adjust a normal fee
award by a factor based on the contingency of compensation for
41 5
the plaintiff's attorney.
The court's failure to expand upon the contingency-ofcompensation factor appears to be due to tacit recognition that
that factor, albeit essential to the continued emergence of private
attorneys general, is difficult to grapple with. If quantified by
some mathematical schedule, such a factor could result in windfall returns for a few, and turn the legal profession into a game
of odds, a mere "money getting trade. '4 16 If it is left to the
unbridled discretion of the judiciary, it may be ignored, and the
frustration of private enforcement of urgent laws may continue.
Nonetheless, some suggestions for the application of the contingency factor may b hazarded.
First of all, contingency factors should be computed and
applied case by case. In some cases, the probability of success is
so great at the outset that no adjustment in a base award would
be appropriate. Courts in antitrust cases, for example, have
recognized that the existence of a prior decree or judgment in a
government suit so enhances the likelihood of later private
success that the size of a "reasonable" fee would be less in that
litigation than in a similar suit brought without the benefit of
4 17
prior adjudication.
When, however, pertinent law is unclear at the outset of a
case, 41 8 or other factors decrease the likelihood of success on a
claim, an upward adjustment in recompense will be warranted.
That adjustment would be greatest in cases in which new law had
412 E.g., id.

413E.g., Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971).
41 E.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
415 Ironically, Lindy was an antitrust treble damage action, the least appealing case for
adjusting fee awards based on prior contingent fee arrangements.
41' United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871 (D.R.I. 1970).
417See Philadelphia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 345 F. Supp. 454, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (antitrust class action settlement); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United SJ OE Machinery
Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258, 302 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated with respect to fee award, 377 F.2d
776, 793 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd in part on other grounds, 392 U.S. 481 (1968). See also Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd with respect to
fee award,
449 F.2d 51, 79 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd an other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
41 8
This is analogous to the perspective a court uses when determining whether a fee
arrangement is ethical: it evaluates the facts known to the parties when the agreement
was formed. See Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 89 (1st
Cir. 1969).
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to be forged or difficult burdens of proof met, 4 19 to encourage

the private bar to take claims which, though potentially meritorious, might for economic reasons go unrepresented. 420 How high

the contingency multiplier factor might rise is especially problematic, and is best left to judicial development. A multiplier
factor of one hundred, even in a case in which the chances of
victory were one in one hundred, would be patently unreasonable; even bringing such a claim could be considered frivolous or
vexatious. On the other hand, a multiplier of two would seem
clearly reasonable in a case whose odds might be computed as
even. Perhaps the best starting point for quantification of the
contingency factor would be an empirical examination of the
relationship between the maximum allowable contingent fee in a
jurisdiction, and the hourly-computed fee which would be
deemed reasonable in comparable cases. The ratio of the former
to the latter would then be the maximum contingency multiplier
in the jurisdiction in question, and would be reserved for the
claims in which compensation at the outset of litigation appeared
most contingent. Appropriately reduced multipliers could then
be established for cases in which compensation was more assured.
2. A Public Interest Factor
Application of an appropriate contingency factor in private
attorney general and common benefit litigation should have the
salutary effect of assuring adequate recompense in such cases,
and of removing any existing financial disincentives to such
public interest litigation. In accordance with present practice,
however, it would appear appropriate for a court to make an
additional upward adjustment in compensation for attorneys
who have undertaken thorny litigation especially requiring
greater incentives to participation by the private bar. 4 1' The
court may place itself in the shoes of an attorney presented with
the facts of the case at hand, and assess such factors as its likely
unpopularity422 or the likelihood that the suit will give rise to
complex or protracted litigation not likely to be lightly
419 See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(class4 2action settlement); Blankenship v. Boyle, 337 F. Supp. 296, 302 (D.D.C. 1972).
' See generally Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 226 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (antitrust class action settlement).
421 See note 401 supra & accompanying text; Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189
(1st Cir. 1959) ("benefits accruing to the public from suits such as this" relevant to a fee
calculation); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 226 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(antitrust class action settlement).
12 See Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 44 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318
(4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 937 (1973). The Bradley court noted that in civil
rights litigation "the unpopularity of the causes and the likelihood of small reward
discourage many lawyers even from mastering the field of law, much less accepting the
cases." Id. See also NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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undertaken.42 3 While certain of such cases may not involve the
difficulties of proof that increase the unlikelihood of victory and,
a fortiori, the contingency of compensation, they may involve
special personal costs which establish a clear need to specially
encourage such litigation. Even a case in which a contingency
adjustment has been made may warrant this separate adjustment. It should be presumed that the application of a contingency multiplier would remove all disincentive to public interest
litigation, and use of this public interest factor should be entrusted to the discretion of the court, to be applied where justice
requires.
V.

CONCLUSION

This brief investigation of the American system of attorney's
fees reveals the confused state of relevant law. Courts and
attorneys have consistently failed to fully grasp and explain the
American Rule, its exceptions, and the policy goals underlying
each. As a result, fees are awarded or denied with little or no
regard for the real effect of an award on the behavior of live
litigants.
While the present Rule may have had some rational basis in
the distant past, it now seems to further no accepted judicial
policy. Despite widespread recognition of this fact, no one has
yet devised a fully viable alternative to the Rule. Minor
modifications can only alleviate its worst effects.
Total repudiation of the American Rule without a thorough
reevaluation of the goals behind fee shifting and a full investigation of the effects of various types of fee shifting upon the
behavior of litigants of different economic strata would be disastrous. Pending such comprehensive investigation, however, some
reforms are both possible and necessary. The expansion of the
bad faith exception to allow fee shifting in cases of dilatory
courtroom tactics, assertion of meritless defenses, and other
unnecessary delay would at least lower the cost of litigation for
the average private litigant and prevent oppressive manipulation
of our legal apparatus. Awarding fees out of the public treasury
in certain cases involving important issues of public policy would
encourage judicial scrutiny of major governmental and business
decisions. Such awards should be tailored to encourage the
representation of all relevant interests before the courts so that a
full and fair hearing will be had on all issues. Fee awards to
Legal Services in cases otherwise appropriate for fee shifting
423 See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 226 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 40 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 937 (1973) (noting technical problems in bringing a class
action civil rights case).
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would generally both further the goals behind the applicable fee
shifting rationale and help to provide increased legal resources
for the poor, the most underrepresented group in our society.
Finally, the courts can increase the effectiveness of fee shifting
by carefully evaluating and clearly articulating the factors used in
calculating the award, taking into account the policies underlying
the award, and awarding fees sufficiently large to achieve those
policies.
These reforms, which can at best alleviate the worst effects
of the present system, are inadequate to achieve the goal of equal
access to the courts. Given the present cost of litigation in the
United States, no amount of tinkering with the system will
accomplish that result. Litigation is now so expensive, and the
needs of poor and middle-class litigants so great, that any
further increase in fee awards would result not only in making
the size of a fee the most important issue in much litigation, but
in awarding attorney's fees that many parties simply could not
pay.
The goal of totally equal access to the courts, then, will have
to be achieved not through the reform of existing judicial doctrines, but through legislative action. Our law is so complicated,
and lawyers' time so expensive, that some broad reform in these
areas appears essential before this country can truly declare that
its courts are equally open to -all its citizens.

